Equilibrium Price Dynamics in Perishable Goods Markets: The Case of Secondary Markets for Major League Baseball Tickets by Andrew Sweeting
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
EQUILIBRIUM PRICE DYNAMICS IN PERISHABLE GOODS MARKETS:








Stephen Finger provided excellent research assistance.  I would like to thank Paul Ellickson, Hanming
Fang, Ian Gale, Brett Gordon, Igal Hendel, Scott Savage, Justin Wolfers and seminar participants at
Duke, London Business School, Wharton, Virginia Tech, the Quantitative Marketing and Economics
Conference (October 2008), the FTC Applied Microeconomics Conference (November 2008) and
the IIOC Conference (May 2008) for many insightful comments.  The usual disclaimer applies.  The
views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by Andrew Sweeting. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Equilibrium Price Dynamics in Perishable Goods Markets: The Case of Secondary Markets
for Major League Baseball Tickets
Andrew Sweeting




This paper analyzes the dynamics of prices in two online secondary markets for Major League Baseball
tickets.  Controlling for ticket quality, prices tend to decline significantly as a game approaches.  The
paper describes and tests alternative theoretical explanations for why this happens in equilibrium, considering
the problems of both buyers and sellers.   It shows that sellers cut prices (either fixed prices or reserve
prices in auctions) because of declining opportunity costs of holding onto tickets as their future selling
opportunities disappear.  Even though prices can be expected to fall, the majority of observed early
purchases can be rationalized by plausible ticket valuations and return to market costs given product








atsweet@duke.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper analyzes the dynamics of prices in two online resale markets for Major League Baseball
(MLB) tickets. I show that various types of list and transaction prices all tend to decline as a game
approaches by economically signiﬁcant amounts (e.g., 25% or more in the last month before the game).
I also explore why declining prices are the equilibrium outcome by examining the behavior of both
buyers and sellers. I show that, consistent with the theoretical literature on the dynamic pricing of
perishable goods, of which event tickets are a classic example, sellers cut prices over time because,
as a game approaches, they become increasingly desperate to sell as their future selling opportunities
disappear. Alternative explanations for why sellers cut prices, such as changing demand and seller
learning, are rejected. I also show that the majority of observed early purchases can be rationalized
despite falling expected prices by uncertain future availability and plausible valuations and costs of
returning to the market at a later date.
The paper makes four contributions. First, it describes a pattern (systematically declining prices)
which many economists, perhaps conditioned by their experience when buying airline tickets, ﬁnd
surprising. The pattern is very robust to considering diﬀerent cuts of the data and it is found in
two diﬀerent marketplaces and across diﬀerent types of selling mechanism (ﬁxed price listings and
auctions).1
Second, the paper provides strong empirical support for theoretical models of dynamic pricing of
perishable goods which have appeared in the economics and operations research literatures, motivated
by the pricing problems facing airlines, hotels, sports teams, radio and television stations selling
commercial time to advertisers and sellers of goods with strong seasonal demand. The models which
are most relevant to the current paper are those where the seller freely adjusts prices over time rather
than committing to a price schedule at the beginning (McAfee and te Velde (2006), Gallego and van
1The pattern that prices for similar or identical items tend to decline when they are sold in sequential auctions has
been noted by Ashenfelter (1989), Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992), McAfee and Vincent (1993), Ginsburgh (1998) and
van den Berg et al. (2001). Most explanations for this “declining price anomaly” have focused on the characteristics
of the particular auction mechanism being used or diﬀerences in the unobserved qualities of the goods being sold. In
contrast, I show that perishability - a shared characteristic of the goods being sold - leads to price declines across several
diﬀerent sales mechanisms, including ﬁxed prices and auctions.
2Ryzin (1994) and Bitran and Mondschein (1993)).2
A stylized version of these models has a seller with a given inventory which can be sold during
a ﬁxed time interval. Customers arrive according to an exogenous stochastic process and their
valuations for one unit of the good are drawn from a distribution which is time invariant. Arriving
customers either buy at once or exit the market. The seller’s optimal price at any point in time is
determined by the opportunity cost of a sale which reﬂects the probability that a current sale prevents
a future sale because of a stock-out. The optimal price decreases with the number of unsold units
and it falls as the end of the interval approaches as there are fewer future opportunities to sell the
remaining units. McAfee and te Velde show that a “robust prediction” of these models is that this
second eﬀect causes the expected price to fall over time.
There has been very little empirical work testing whether these models describe how sellers price
perishable goods.3 McAfee and te Velde examine data from the airline industry but reject the
declining price prediction as prices tend to increase as the day of departure approaches (a pattern also
found by Escobari and Gan (2007) and Puller et al. (2008) using diﬀerent airline datasets). Plausible
explanations for this rejection are that, contrary to the assumptions made in the theory, consumers
arriving close to the departure date tend to have higher valuations (e.g., business travellers) or that
airlines seek to commit to increasing prices in order to aﬀect when potentially strategic customers
purchase.
In my data commitment incentives are unlikely to be important because each seller is small relative
to the market and they are also relatively anonymous. Each seller is also typically only trying to
sell one set of similar tickets (e.g., same game and section) so that the prediction of declining prices
emerges directly (i.e., there are no inventory eﬀects for most sellers). I show that not only do prices
2These models are the most relevant to my paper because they assume that sellers adjust prices in response to
realizations of demand. Prescott (1975) and Dana (1999) show that equilibrium price dispersion can be generated in
models where sellers commit to prices or price distributions before demand is realized. In the airline industry, this type
of assumption would be consistent with airlines preallocating groups of seats to diﬀerent pricing buckets. Gale and
Holmes (1992, 1993) and Dana (1998) study the role of another airline industry practice, advance purchase discounting,
at eﬃciently spreading demand across ﬂights.
3There has been some empirical work on the dynamics of prices in settings without perishability (e.g., Aguirregabiria
(1999)).
3decline as a game approaches but also that prices fall because of declining opportunity costs just as
the theoretical models predict.
The third contribution relates to my analysis of early purchasing. Declining prices can only be the
equilibrium outcome if some people are willing to purchase early when expected prices are relatively
high.4 The theoretical literature has recently started to examine how the ability of consumers to
strategically time their purchases should aﬀect pricing policies (Aviv and Pazgal (2008), Liu and van
Ryzin (2008), Dasu and Tong (2008), Levin et al. (2008), Zhou et al. (2006)) and it has shown that
e a r l yp u r c h a s e sc a nb er a t i o n a l i z e de v e nw h e ne x p e c t ed prices are falling by uncertainty about future
availability and prices, search costs or risk aversion.5 Ip r o v i d et h eﬁrst empirical analysis of these
ideas by using calibrated models of buyer utility to analyze observed early purchase decisions. I show
that uncertainties about the future availability and prices of particular types of ticket combined with
plausible valuations and return to market (search) costs can rationalize the majority of observed early
purchases. There are also patterns in the data, concerning who tends to purchase early and which
types of ticket tend to purchased early, that are consistent with uncertainty and return to market
costs being important.
The paper’s ﬁnal contribution is to shed some new light on how secondary event ticket markets
work. Revenues in these markets are projected to grow from $2.6 billion in 2007 to $4.5 billion in
2012 with 70% of revenues coming from sports tickets (Forrester Research (2008)) and they are also
becoming increasingly accepted by primary market sellers. For example, Stubhub.com became the
oﬃcial resale site for MLB in 2008. The existing theoretical (Courty (2000, 2003a,b), Karp and Perloﬀ
(2005)) and empirical (Leslie and Sorensen (2007)) literatures analyze these markets using one-shot
market clearing models. My analysis provides insights into how the price formation and allocation
4An alternative objection is that declining prices would provide sellers with short-selling opportunities: a seller would
sell a pledge to provide a ticket a long time before the game before buying the ticket closer to the game at a lower price.
This type of strategy is inhibited by the importance of product diﬀerentiation: it is diﬃcult for a seller to know which
sections and rows will be available in advance but buyers value knowing the particular section and row of the tickets
they are purchasing. In my Market 2 data the transaction price is, on average, around 17% lower if row information is
missing than would be expected for a third row listing for the same game and section.
5Strategic consumer behavior has, of course, played an important role in the durable goods literature (e.g., Coase
(1972), Stokey (1979)).
4process actually works.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and Section 3 establishes that
prices decline controlling for ticket quality. Section 4 outlines three competing theoretical explanations
for why sellers cut prices as a game approaches, and it presents reduced-form evidence which is
inconsistent with one of them, the Lazear learning model. Section 5 estimates structural models of
the price-setting problem. The results support the theory that sellers cut prices because of declining
opportunity costs of sale. Section 6 examines why some buyers choose to purchase early when prices
are expected to decline. Section 7 concludes.
2D a t a
2.1 Secondary Market Data
This paper uses new datasets from two large online secondary markets for tickets for regular season
MLB games in 2007.
2.1.1 Stubhub.com
The ﬁrst dataset contains data on list prices from Stubhub.com, collected using an automated script.6
Stubhub operates as a market for all types of event tickets. From the perspective of a buyer, sellers
are anonymous but Stubhub guarantees to supply tickets at least as good as those purchased if the
seller fails to do so. Tickets to a particular game are listed on a single page and since 2006 Stubhub
has provided a clickable map of each stadium which shows the availability and prices of tickets in each
seating section. I only use listings in Stubhub’s ﬁxed price format which accounted for 99.5% of all
listings in 2007, with auctions accounting for the remainder. Seller can change prices at any time, and
a small number of listings (0.4%) use a format where prices decline linearly as the game approaches.
I also exclude these listings from the analysis of the Stubhub data, although the fact that Stubhub
6Stubhub was purchased by EBay in January 2007 and from 2008 it is acting as MLB’s oﬃcial “Fan to Fan Market-
place”.
5chooses to make such an option available is instructive about how sellers may want to price.
Sellers list tickets on Stubhub for free, but pay a 15% commission in the event of a sale. Buyers
pay a 10% commission in the event of sale plus Stubhub-set shipping costs ($11.95 per listing if the
transaction is more than 14 days before the game and $16.95 per listing if the transaction is between
4 and 14 days before the game). Tickets can only be sold within 3 days of the game if hard copies are
supplied to Stubhub which can pass them to buyers, who pay a $15 handling charge, at oﬃces close
to each stadium.
Data was collected from Stubhub.com’s “buy” page for each game on a daily basis from January
6, 2007 to September 30, 2007. For each listing I observe a listing identiﬁcation number, the game
(e.g., Seattle Mariners at the New York Yankees on May 6), the number of seats available and whether
less than the full number can be bought, the section and row (e.g., Loge Box 512 row D at Yankee
Stadium) and the listed price per seat. The identiﬁcation number allows only imperfect tracking of
listings across days as it is clear that many sellers enter a new listing when changing the price.7 In
the analysis which follows I only use listings with non-missing section information (over 99.7% of the
sample), six or fewer seats (91%) and tickets with prices less than $1,000 per seat (99.98%). I also
exclude three Tampa Bay games which were played in Orlando and make-up games for rainouts as
these are often scheduled at short notice. I include games which were rained out as I am looking at
price dynamics in the days and weeks leading up to the game rather than on the day itself.
The limitation of the Stubhub data is that it contains data only on posted prices and not on
transactions. While I observe tickets which cease to be listed I do not know whether this is because
they are sold on Stubhub or sold elsewhere, possibly at a diﬀerent price. On the other hand, the
dataset contains a huge number of observations and allows me to conﬁrm the pricing patterns I ﬁnd
in my second dataset.
7To be speciﬁc, for roughly two-thirds of the occassions where I s e eat i c k e t i de x i tt h ed a t aIs e ean e wl i s t i n gf o r
seats in the same section and row appearing the next day.
62.1.2 “Market 2”
The second dataset comes from a major online market where all types of products, not just event
tickets, are traded. The data license prevents me from disclosing the identity of the market so the
following description is in relatively general terms and I shall refer to it as Market 2. A seller can list
tickets in several diﬀerent sale formats, including auctions of diﬀerent durations, a pure ﬁxed price
format, a ﬁxed price format where buyers can also make oﬀers to the seller and a hybrid auction
format where a customer can buy a ticket at a ﬁxed price if no bids have yet been placed in the
auction. When selling in an auction the buyer sets a start price for the auction and may also choose
to set a secret reserve price.
Sellers pay a small listing fee and a small commission (between 1% and 7%) which varies with the
transaction price and the sale format. Buyers pay no commission but pay shipping costs set by the
seller. Buyers are able to see a seller’s username and current feedback score, and are likely to care
about reputations because the market does not oﬀer a Stubhub-like guarantee.
The full dataset contains information on all event ticket listings from January 1 to September
30, 2007, and I use the subset of observations for single regular season (i.e., no season tickets) MLB
games excluding the Orlando games and make-ups.8 For each listing I observe the game, the identity
number of the seller, the number of seats available, the section and row, the sale format and the
relevant prices (e.g., ﬁxed price, auction start price or both and whether there is a secret reserve), the
start date and duration of the listing, the seller’s revenues from the listing and some of the additional
text from the listing provided by the seller. I also know if the listing was highlighted on a search
page or contained additional information such as pictures. For every auction bid, oﬀer or ﬁxed price
purchase the data records the identity number of the bidder and the level of the bid together with
an indicator for if the bid was successful. For each transaction, the data records the feedback scores
of the seller and the buyer, the shipping cost and (a relatively novel aspect of the data) the zipcodes
8Market 2 was unable to supply me with attribute (section, row, number of seats) data for listings which ended on
May 18, 2007, so these listings are excluded in what follows. The full (all event ticket) dataset is useful in ﬁlling in
information, such as zipcodes and feedback scores, on sellers who only have a few MLB listings.
7of the buyer and seller. Section and row information is reported in a less uniform pattern than on
Stubhub, so considerable eﬀort was spent linking tickets to speciﬁc sections within each stadium.9
The section could not be identiﬁed for 0.5% of listings which were dropped. Dummies are included
for listings with missing row data in all of the analysis which follows. I exclude listings with more
than six seats, prices above $1,000 or shipping costs above $40 (0.7% of the sample).
2.2 Primary Market Data
The secondary market data is complemented by several types of data from the primary market and
on team performance. Game results and attendances for 2000 to 2007 are taken from Retrosheet.org
and are used to model expected attendance as well as to control for the current record (form) of each
team. Stadium capacities are measured using the maximum observed attendance each year as these
exceed recorded capacities for many teams. The single game price (face value) for each game and
section was collected from team websites. Some teams, such as the Boston Red Sox, charge the same
prices irrespective of the opposition, whereas others, like the New York Mets, have several pricing
tiers which depend on the opposition and the day of the week. Face value information is missing for
some season ticket only sections and for all Colorado Rockies games. No teams practised dynamic
pricing in the primary market.
2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows how the listings are distributed across MLB teams and, based on transactions observed
on Market 2, some additional measures of pricing, market concentration and the timing of sales. Most
listings are available for more than one day: on Stubhub the average listing lasts 16 days; on Market
2 auction listings last for an average of 4.5 days and non-auction listings for 19 days. Stubhub has
more listings than Market 2 for every team, although the ratio of listings shows some variation across
teams. The teams with the most listings and highest secondary market prices on both sites tend to
9On Stubhub sellers also have strong incentives to provide the section and row information in a standard format as
otherwise their listing will not appear on the clickable map.
8be those in the largest cities with the highest realized attendances, which is consistent with secondary
markets existing partly because of excess demand in the primary market. Secondary markets for
baseball tickets also allow season ticket holders, who may have the right to go to 81 home games, to
sell their seats for games they do not want. This leads to there being many very small sellers: 63% of
sellers on Market 2 have only one or two listings across all games and 90% of sellers have fewer than
15 listings and list tickets for only one team. 139 sellers, who are likely to be professional resellers,
have more than 500 listings each and these account for around 30% of all listings. However, even
these largest sellers are small relative to the total market.
For all but two teams the average secondary market is above the average primary market price,
even though the reported average primary market price is biased downwards because I cannot identify
face values for some premium season-ticket only sections. The Boston Red Sox appear to have
underpriced their tickets the most, consistent with Fenway Park having been sold out for all games
since May 2003 as well as the team having a particularly successful 2007 (they won the World Series).10
Most purchases happen in the last three weeks before the game, although the average number of days
before the game is signiﬁcantly higher. There is a positive correlation between the median distance
buyers live from the ground (based on the shipping zipcode) and the average number of days before
the game when purchases take place. This correlation will play a role in rationalizing buyer behavior.
Table 2 provides some more detailed statistics on listings. Stubhub has many more 4 seat listings
than Market 2, but 93% of these listings allow a pair of seats to be purchased. Single unit (e.g., a
listing for a pair of seats) pure auctions are the most popular sales mechanism on Market 2, followed
by single unit hybrid auctions and ﬁxed price listings. Multi-unit auctions, where diﬀerent buyers
can buy diﬀerent quantities of similar seats, are relatively rare. More single-unit pure auctions result
in sales than other formats.
The lower part of Table 2 provides further summary statistics on prices. The average face value
of tickets listed on the two sites is similar. The large diﬀerence between buyer and seller prices
10Of course, whether teams like the Red Sox are mispricing depends on the dynamics of demand (e.g., fan loyalty, the
value of future TV rights) and the objective function that teams are trying to maximize.
9on Stubhub reﬂects the large commissions and shipping costs. Of course, buyers may be willing to
pay a premium for buying on Stubhub if it oﬀers more secure transactions and easier purchasing.
Comparing secondary market prices across the sites is not straightforward because I only observe
listed ﬁxed prices on Stubhub while I observe many diﬀerent types of price, such as auction start
prices, on Market 2. The most direct comparison is between listed seller prices on Stubhub and listed
pure ﬁxed prices on Market 2 from which seller commissions have been deducted (the bottom line in
the table). These prices are very similar as a proportion of ticket face value.
The paper is focused on how prices change as the game approaches. Figure 1 summarizes how
several features of the market evolve. Figure 1(a) shows that the number of listings evolves diﬀerently
on the two sites (I include pure auction listings only on the day the auction ends) with the number of
listings on Market 2 peaking ﬁve days before the game. The mix of sales mechanisms on Market 2 also
changes over time with diﬀerent types of auction mechanism becoming more prevalent. Regressions
show that this shift takes place within sellers as well as across sellers, and it is likely to be explained
by sellers placing greater value on the price ﬂe x i b i l i t yp r o v i d e db ya u c t i o n sw h e nt h e ya r ev e r yk e e nt o
sell. All types of listing are more likely to result in sales as the game approaches, except for single unit
pure auctions where the probability of sale declines in the last few days. This may be explained by
buyers valuing the certainty oﬀered by ﬁxed price listings when there are fewer buying opportunities
left. Figure 4(d) shows what happens to the observable quality of listed tickets as a game approaches
(higher face values and lower row numbers are better). Changes in quality are relatively small, with
row quality increasingly slightly and face values declining slightly until the last few days. A similar
analysis of transacted tickets (rather than listings) shows slight increases in both average row quality
and face values as the game approaches.
3 Robust Evidence of Price Declines
This section shows that both list and transaction prices tend to fall, controlling for ticket quality, as
a game approaches. This ﬁnding is very robust and the declines are large in size.
10To examine pricing patterns for vertically diﬀerentiated products it is necessary to control for ticket
quality. I control for quality using diﬀerent types of ﬁxed eﬀect and it is useful to take a moment to
understand how these are deﬁned. A game refers to a particular ﬁxture between two teams scheduled
for a particular day (e.g., Seattle Mariners at the New York Yankees on May 6). A game-section ﬁxed
eﬀect is a dummy for those listings for seats in a particular section for a particular game (e.g., Loge
Box 512 for the Seattle Mariners at the New York Yankees on May 6). Many stadia have over two
hundred of these sections and there may be many sections with the same face value (in my example,
odd numbered Loge Boxes 473 to 545 and even numbered Loge Boxes 474 to 548 have a face value
price of $55). A game-section-row ﬁxed eﬀect is even more detailed (e.g., Loge Box 512 Row D for
the Seattle Mariners at the New York Yankees on May 6). When I do not include game-section-row
ﬁxed eﬀects I include ﬁve variables (the “row variables”) to control for row quality: dummies for the
ﬁrst and second rows, a linear count variable for the row number and dummies for the identity of the
row not being available and the row not being relevant (e.g., open seating bleachers). I also include
variables for other listing characteristics such as the seats not being in the same row (e.g., “piggy
back” seats), on an aisle and whether the listing includes parking.11
3.1 Stubhub
Table 3 shows the coeﬃcients from linear ﬁxed eﬀects regression models estimated using list prices
from Stubhub. Prices are deﬁned per seat. The independent variables are a set of dummies measuring
the days to go until the game, measures of form for both teams (only the home team coeﬃcients are
reported), the ﬁxed eﬀects, dummies for the number of seats (interacted with a dummy for whether
fewer seats can be purchased), listing characteristics such as the piggy back variable and, where
relevant, the row variables. The reported coeﬃcients come from regressions using daily observations
from a random 5% sample of sections for each game (e.g., all day-listings observations for Loge Box
512 for the New York Yankees vs. Seattle Mariners on May 6) because there are too many daily
11Tickets can only be listed on Stubhub if they are directly next to each other (same row or piggy back). I drop listings
from Market 2 if there is any indication that the tickets are not together.
11listings to use all observations. The coeﬃcients are almost identical using other sub-samples. To
allow for correlations across listings available on multiple days, standard errors are correlated on the
listing identiﬁcation number.
The speciﬁcation in column (1) includes game-section ﬁxed eﬀects so that the coeﬃcients are
identiﬁe df r o ms e a t si nt h es a m es e c t i o nw h i c ha r el i s t e da td i ﬀerent prices. The dependent variable
is the log of the revenues received by the seller excluding commissions and shipping costs (the seller
price). The Days to Go coeﬃcients which are precisely estimated indicate that list prices tend decline
before a game. For example, prices are 22% higher 30-32 days before the game than 0-2 days before.12
The estimated decline is quite smooth and it accelerates as the game approaches. The form variables
have plausible signs: prices tend to fall when a team slips back from the top of its division. The row
coeﬃcients show that prices fall by 1% for each row ones moves back within a section, with a 10%
front row premium.
Column (2) includes game-section-row ﬁxed eﬀects to control in a more comprehensive way for
row quality. The estimated percentage price declines are slightly larger than in column (1) and I
include game-section-row ﬁxed eﬀects in the remaining Stubhub regressions. The dollar value of the
seller price is the dependent variable in column (3), with an estimated price decline in the last month
of $14.66 per seat. Column (4) uses the log of the buyer price, which includes the shipping cost and
the buyer’s commission. The shipping cost, which increases two weeks prior to the game, creates
a small non-monotonicity in the price decline but otherwise the price declines are similar. Column
(5) uses the seller price divided by the face value of the ticket as the dependent variable, with those
observations for which no face value can be identiﬁed being dropped. On average, prices fall from
being 94% above face value 30 days before a game to being 56% above face value 0-2 days before.
One can also examine what happens to the prices of individual listings over time by including listing
id ﬁxed eﬀects (Table 6, column (6)) and, once again, the percentage price declines are similar. In
12I focus on declines in the last 80 or so days prior to the game as I only have three months of pre-game data for games
at the beginning of the season. The number of observations covered by the 81 plus dummy therefore varies across the
season. All of the estimates are similar using only observations from the last three months prior to a game for all games.
12addition, 89% of observed price changes for individual listings are price reductions.
The remaining columns of Table 3 show that this pattern is robust for diﬀerent sub-samples of the
data. Columns (6) and (7) show that price declines are quite similar for cheap (face value less than
$20) and expensive (face value more than $45 or season ticket only) sections. The remaining columns
divide the sample based on the game’s expected attendance 90 days before the game is played. This
is predicted using a censored normal regression model estimated using data on all games played from
2000 to 2007. The dependent variable is the proportion of capacity which is ﬁlled and the explanatory
variables are the form variables (90 days before the game), home team x year, home team x day of
week, home team x month and away team dummies, plus dummies for the type of game (interleague,
cross-division and within-division).13 The percentage price declines are larger for games with lower
demands.
The regressions show that average prices decline, but this does not rule out the possibility that
the upper percentiles of the price distribution simultaneously increase. This would be important as
it would provide a simple explanation for why risk-averse buyers might want to purchase early. To
examine what happens to the price distribution I regress log prices on the same variables as before
excluding the Days to Go dummies. Figure 2(a) shows how the distribution of the residuals from the
regression using the seller price changes in the two months before the game. The bottom 85% of the
price distribution falls as the game approaches without the higher percentiles increasing.
3.2 Market 2
Table 4 reports the results using transaction data from Market 2. There may be more than one
observation per listing for multi-unit listings. The speciﬁcations are similar to those for Stubhub,
except that I also include observable seller characteristics (including four dummies for the seller’s
feedback score, less than 10, 11 to 100, 101 to 1000 and greater than 1000) and listing characteristics,
such as whether the listing is highlighted. Additional dummies are included for observations where
13As I deﬁne capacity as the maximum realized attendance and the realized attendance at each game can vary even
when all tickets are sold, I topcode the data at 98% of capacity and use this as the censoring point.
13shipping costs or feedback scores are missing (1,352 observations).
The column (1) speciﬁcation uses the log of the buyer price, which includes shipping costs, as the
dependent variable and includes game-section ﬁxed eﬀects. Prices tend to fall as the game approaches,
declining by 25% on average in the last month before the game. There are two diﬀerences to the
Stubhub results. First, reﬂecting the smaller sample size, the decline in prices in the last 45 days
before the game are not perfectly monotonic. However, most of the deviations from monotonicity
are small and not statistically signiﬁcant. Second, there is evidence that prices increase by a small
amount prior to 50 days before the game. I return to why this price increase may be happening in a
moment.
The column (2) speciﬁcation includes game-section-row ﬁxed eﬀects. The pattern of declining
prices is similar to column (1) but, in the Market 2 data, only 125,848 transactions come from game-
section-rows with more than one observation. For this reason, I use the game-section ﬁxed eﬀects and
row control variables in the remaining regressions. Column (3) uses the log of the seller price, which
takes out the seller’s commission and does not include the shipping cost, as the dependent variable.
The decline in prices is similar to column (1) except that prices appear to increase immediately before
the game. This reﬂects a surprising fact about how average shipping costs change. The average
shipping cost falls from $4.30 per seat 4 days before a game to only $1.49 per seat on the day of the
game itself, as many sellers oﬀer to personally deliver tickets to a local buyer or to meet them at the
stadium.
Columns (1)-(3) pool tickets sold through diﬀerent sales mechanisms. The speciﬁcation in column
(4) includes dummy variables to control for the type of mechanism used (e.g., a pure single unit auction
sale, a hybrid auction auction sale, a hybrid auction ﬁxed price sale, etc.) to test whether changes in
the mechanism mix explain the price declines. The estimated price declines are essentially unchanged.
However, further analysis reveals that the increase in average transaction prices between 80 and 50
days before the game are generated only from auction sales. In column (5) auction sales are excluded
(ﬁxed price sales in hybrid auctions are included) and there is no evidence of price increases (the
14diﬀerence between the 81 plus coeﬃcient and the 30-32 day coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant at the 1%
level). On the other hand, when the regression is repeated using only auction sales the 30-32, 39-41,
61-70 and 81 plus day coeﬃcients are 0.251 (0.012), 0.276 (0.014), 0.208 (0.012) and 0.132 (0.010)
respectively, and the initial price increase is statistically signiﬁcant.
The remaining transaction price regressions repeat the column (1) speciﬁcation for several sub-
samples of the data. The number of observations is smaller in these regressions so that the price
declines in the last 40 days are less monotonic, although once again the deviations from monotonicity
are typically not statistically signiﬁcant. The price declines are smaller in percentage terms for more
expensive tickets. However unlike for Stubhub, there is no clear relationship between the expected
attendance of a game and the size of the price decline.
Figure 2(b) shows how the distribution of the residuals from regressing the log of the buyer
transaction price on the control variable excluding the Days to Go dummies changes as the game
approaches. Once again, the price distribution falls over time below 85th percentile, especially in the
last 40 days before the game, without increasing at higher percentiles.
Table 5 presents regressions using two types of list prices: ﬁxed prices (whether as part of pure
ﬁxed price listings, ﬁxed price listings with oﬀers, or hybrid auctions) and starting prices in auctions
(of all types). There is one observation per listing even if multiple units are available. 4.6% of
auctions also have a separate secret reserve price and I include a dummy for these auctions in the
regressions, as well as dummies for the type of mechanism used.
In columns (1) and (2) the Days to Go dummy variables are calculated based on the start date
of the listing. On average, ﬁxed prices decline as the game approaches by more than transaction
prices do. Auction start prices decline by very large amounts until about two weeks before the game
a n dt h e nr e m a i nf a i r l yc o n s t a n t . T h es i z eo f the price declines, particularly for ﬁxed price listings,
are sensitive to how the number of days to go is counted. Columns (3)-(4) report results using
the number of days from the end of the listing to the game. As listings which are more expensive
15(conditional on quality) tend to remain unsold, prices fall by less using this deﬁnition.14 For auctions,
the price declines continue until about a week before the game, although they increase in the last few
days. A notable feature of the auction results is that even though auction transaction prices are
increasing more than 50 days before a game, auction start prices are always declining. This suggests
that transaction prices may be increasing because, a long time before the game, people submit low
bids because they know that if they do not win they will have plenty of opportunities to try to buy
tickets later on.15
Columns (5)-(8) report the list price results dividing the data into the ten MLB teams with the
most listings and the rest. The ﬁxed price declines are very similar for the two groups. The declines
are also similar for auction start prices except that prices increase in the last ﬁve days before the game
for the teams with the least listings.
4 Theoretical Explanations for Why Sellers Cut Prices
The rest of the paper examines why declining prices are the equilibrium outcome. I split the problem
into two parts: why do sellers tend to cut prices (or accept lower revenues) over time given buyer
demand? and second, why are some buyers willing to purchase early when prices are expected to fall?
This split is appropriate because individual buyers and sellers are small relative to the total size of
the market, so should take the behavior of the other side of the market as given when choosing their
pricing or purchasing strategy. For example, an individual seller is unlikely to believe that she can
shift demand earlier by trying to commit to increasing prices. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the behavior
of sellers while Section 6 examines the early purchase decisions of buyers.
In this section I describe three plausible explanations for why sellers cut prices over time. Some
alternative explanations can be disposed of immediately. First, in some markets the existence of
14For ﬁx e dp r i c e sIh a v ea l s op e r f o r m e dt h er e g r e s s i o nu s i n ga v a i l a b l el i s t i n g ss ot h es a m el i s t i n gm a ya p p e a rm o r e
than once, as in the Stubhub regressions. In this case the estimated fall in prices in the 30-32 days prior to the game is
23.9%, which is very similar to the estimate in Table 3 column (1) using the Stubhub data.
15There is also slightly less participation in earlier auctions, so that a greater proportion of auctions result in sales at
close to the start price. In the last 40 days before a game 25% of auctions result in sales within $2.50 of the start price,
whereas 30% do more than 40 days before.
16a set of impatient consumers may explain why some people purchase early when prices are high.
Impatience is not a viable explanation here as no-one can use their tickets until the day of the game.
Second, while discounting may be important over a time period of several months, it should tend to
lead to increasing prices as buyers would have to be compensated for paying for their tickets ahead
of when they get to consume the product. Third, any uncertainty about the value of the game (for
example, whether it will be important in a playoﬀ race) combined with buyer risk aversion should also
tend to lead to increasing equilibrium prices because more information about the quality of the game
is revealed over time.
4.1 Seller Explanations 1 and 2: Falling Opportunity Costs and Time-Varying
Demand/Revenue Elasticities
The ﬁrst two explanations can be described in a single framework. Suppose that a risk-neutral seller
i has a single unit to sell and that there are two time periods before the game, t =1 ,2.T h e s e l l e r
gets a payoﬀ of $vi, which could reﬂect the value of attending the game herself, giving the ticket to a
friend or selling it outside the stadium, if the unit is unsold after period 2. For now I assume that the
seller sets a ﬁxed price pit in each period and that the probability that the ticket sells is Qit(pit) where
∂Qit(pit)
∂pit < 0. This probability of sale, or demand, function will reﬂect the quality of i’s ticket, the
extent of competition from other sellers and the prices that they set, the arrival rate of heterogeneous
buyers and their ability to substitute between periods and between diﬀerentiated tickets. I assume
that seller i knows Qit(pit) for both periods in advance and that Qi2 does not depend on pi1.16 i will
therefore set prices pi1 and pi2 by solving
max
pi1,pi2
pi1Qi1(pi1)+pi2Qi2(pi2)(1 − Qi1(pi1)) + vi(1 − Qi2(pi2))(1 − Qi1(pi1)) (1)
16Qi2 might depend on pi1 if i’s ﬁrst period price causes some buyers to wait until the second period for i to lower his
price. My formulation essentially assumes that an individual seller i is too small relative to the market for his own ﬁrst
period price to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on his second period demand.
17Assuming that the relevant second-order conditions are satisﬁed, prices will satisfy
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These conditions show that there are two reasons why prices may fall over time. First, the demand
function may become more elastic causing the optimal price/mark-up to fall. Second, the opportunity
cost of selling tends to fall as future selling opportunities disappear. In the last period, the opportunity
cost of selling is vi whereas in the ﬁrst period it is (p∗
i2Qi2(p∗
i2)+vi(1−Qi2(p∗
i2))) and because p∗
i2 >v i
the opportunity cost of sale must be falling. If Qi1(pi) ≡ Qi2(pi) (i.e., the demand function is the
same in both periods) then the opportunity cost eﬀect will lead to falling optimal prices, just as in
the theoretical literature on the dynamic pricing of perishable goods.17
Similar arguments apply for auction listings. If Qit(pit) is the probability of sale given the
start/reserve price pit (
∂Qit(pit)
∂pit < 0)a n dRit(pit) is the seller’s expected revenue in the event of sale
with
∂Rit(pit)























i2)))] = 0 (5)
If the probability of sale and revenue functions are the same in both periods then declining opportunity
costs will lead to declining prices. On the other hand, changing Q or R functions could also contribute
to the price declines.
17If the Q function is linear then prices also fall increasingly quickly as the game approaches, which is the pattern that
I observe in the data.
184.2 Seller Explanation 3: Learning by Sellers
Lazear’s (1986) model of clearance sales provides an alternative explanation for falling prices. Lazear’s
basic model has a seller trying to sell one unit of an item in two periods. All customers have the same
reservation value for the item, about which the seller has some prior beliefs. The optimal pricing
strategy involves a high price in the ﬁrst period. If the good does not sell then the seller infers that
customer valuations are likely to be lower and cuts the price in the second period. By assumption,
customers are unwilling or unable to substitute across periods. The key diﬀerence to the previous
analysis is that prices change due to seller learning rather than perishability or changes in underlying
demand, and it is useful to rule out this explanation because the rest of the analysis will assume that
sellers know the demand function they are facing.
Lazear describes several observable implications of his model. First, with multiple periods, he
shows that prices should decline with the time since the seller ﬁrst tried to sell the good (tenure) and
that prices should fall more slowly over time as tenure increases. On the other hand, if perishability
drives price declines then the price declines should be related to the time until the game rather
than tenure. The ﬁrst six columns of Table 6 reports regression results where I include a ﬁfth-order
polynomial for tenure and seller-ticket ﬁxed eﬀects to look at how prices change for individual tickets.18
For ﬁxed price listings in both markets, the Days to Go coeﬃcients are similar with and without the
tenure variables and the tenure coeﬃcients imply small eﬀects (e.g., prices fall 1.9% with 10 days of
tenure and 3.4% with 20 days of tenure in Market 2). The tenure eﬀects are larger for auctions in
Market 2 (start prices drop 11.3% with 10 days of tenure and 18.2% with 20 days) but the Days to Go
(perishability) eﬀects are still larger. The coeﬃcients are almost unchanged if one includes additional
polynomials in the number of times that the tickets are relisted (which may also aﬀect learning),
as well as the polynomial for the time since ﬁrst listing. Second, Lazear’s model predicts that the
18For the Stubhub data this means ticket id ﬁxed eﬀects and for Market 2 seller-game-section ﬁxed eﬀects. For Market
2 time since listing is calculated as the length of time since the seller ﬁrst listed tickets for the same game and section,
and for Stubhub it is calculated as the time since the ticket id was listed. As Stubhub id numbers may change when a
seller changes the price, I only include ticket ids which I consider likely to represent initial listings. These are listings
where the appearance of the listing id did not coincide with the disappearance of a listing id for the same game, section
and row.
19probability of sale in any period should remain unchanged even as prices fall (his p. 22). Figure 1(c)
shows that sale probabilities tend to increase in my data, at least until the last couple of days before
the game, which is consistent with sellers moving down a known demand curve as the opportunity
costs of sale fall.
A possible objection is that these predictions depend on the particular assumptions of Lazear’s
model and that their failure reﬂects the inaccuracy of the assumptions rather than the absence of
learning. For example, the arrival rate of consumers may increase as the game approaches, making
learning and sale probabilities a function of the time until the game rather than the time since listing.
However, Lazear’s model also makes a cross-seller/ticket prediction which should be more robust:
the tightness of sellers’ priors and their rate of learning should aﬀect observed price declines. For
example, if markets are thick then there may be less learning and smaller price declines. However, the
regressions in Table 5 show that listed price declines on Market 2 are similar for teams with diﬀerent
amounts of trade. Regressions using list prices on Stubhub and transaction prices on Market 2
generate similar results. A perhaps more convincing comparison is between sellers with diﬀerent
amounts of experience of selling MLB tickets. Columns (7)-(10) of Table 6 show that the sellers
who sell the most MLB tickets on Market 2, and so should tend to have the most information about
demand, tend to cut prices more dramatically than sellers who sell the least, at least up until 3 days
before the game. This is the opposite of what a learning model would predict. On the other hand,
it is consistent with an opportunity cost story if professional sellers have the greatest ability to try to
relist unsold tickets, which should lead them to set high prices early on, and/or the least incentive to
use tickets themselves or give them away, which should cause them to set low prices right before the
game.
205 Testing the Opportunity Cost and Demand Elasticity Explana-
tions for Why Sellers Reduce Prices
I estimate the contribution of falling opportunity costs to the observed price declines by estimating
structural models of the price-setting decision. The idea is simple. Suppose that seller i uses a ﬁxed
price listing in period t. He will set price pit to maximize
max
pit
pitQit(pit)+oit(1 − Qit(pit)) (6)
where Qit is the probability of sale (or demand) function and oit is the opportunity cost of sale at
time t.A s i n ( 3 ) , oit will reﬂect his ability to try to sell an unsold ticket in future periods, possibly
at diﬀerent prices. Assuming second-order conditions are satisﬁe d ,t h eo p t i m a lp r i c ew i l lb e
p∗





and given estimates of the Q function, the opportunity cost implied by the observed price can be
calculated





(7) can be used to perform counterfactuals to quantify the role of declining opportunity costs and
changes in demand. Speciﬁcally, I calculate what the price of each listing would have been without
any changes in demand and then compare these counterfactual prices with those observed in the data.
Auction listings can be analyzed in a similar way allowing for revenues to exceed the start price in
the event of a sale.
Before getting into the details, a few general comments are in order. First, unlike most of the
recent structural demand and auction literature, I do not attempt to estimate underlying consumer
preferences (e.g., bidder valuations). As noted by Hendricks and Porter (2007), doing so is diﬃcult in
21an environment where consumers may searching across multiple listings. Second, modelling a seller as
facing a static pricing problem when he chooses his price is not inconsistent with sellers being able to
relist their tickets in multiple periods: this ability is reﬂected in the opportunity cost implied by their
choice of price.19 Third, sellers are assumed to be risk-neu t r a l . Ie s t i m a t et h a ts o m es e l l e r sh a v e
negative opportunity costs, which is unrealistic given free-disposal. One interpretation of negative
costs is that risk or loss aversion causes the seller to price below the expected revenue-maximizing
level. An alternative interpretation is that some sellers may be constrained by state anti-scalping
laws or a sense of fairness from setting prices which are above the cost or face value of the ticket.
Finally, all of the analysis uses data from Market 2 as I need to observe transactions.
The next sub-section details the speciﬁcations used. The following sub-section describes how I
address price endogeneity. I then describe the empirical results, which support the hypothesis that
prices fall because of declining opportunity costs rather than changing elasticities, consistent with
dynamic pricing models.
5.1 Empirical Speciﬁcations
5.1.1 Pure Fixed Price Listings
A ﬁxed price listing can either result in a sale at the stated ﬁxed price or no sale. The probability
of sale (demand) function is modeled as a probit function of observed listing characteristics (Xit), the
listed ﬁxed price (pit, deﬁned per seat including shipping costs) and the characteristics and prices of
competing listings (X−it and p−it)20
Qit(pit)=Φ(pit,X it,p −it,X −it,θFP)
19The structure of a dynamic model could be used to place additional restrictions on how opportunity costs evolve.
Instead I show that one obtains patterns which are consistent with a theoretical dynamic model without imposing these
restrictions.
20I do not observe shipping costs for listings which do not sell, but these costs may aﬀect demand. I address this
problem by assuming that unsold listings have (i) the average shipping cost of listings by the same seller sold in the same
time period (deﬁned in a moment) before the game and, if this is not available, (ii) the average shipping costs of tickets
sold by sellers living as far from the stadium in which the game was played in the same time period prior to the game.
As shipping costs are generally small I hope that these approximations will not seriously bias the results, especially once
I instrument for a listing’s own price.
22As ﬁxed price listings which do not sell may remain listed for diﬀerent lengths of time (and I do not
observe how long a sold listing would have remained listed), I deﬁne the dependent variable as whether
the ticket sold within ten days of listing.21
As prices can diﬀer substantially across listings because of ticket quality, the base speciﬁcation
uses relative prices, deﬁned as the listed price divided by the face value of the ticket. The demand
curve is allowed to vary over time by including a set of time dummies similar to those used in Section
3 and by allowing the own price coeﬃcients to vary across four “time periods” (1-10, 11-20, 21-40
and 41 or more days before the game).22 I control for listing quality by including the various ticket
and seller characteristics variables used in Section 3 (e.g., the seller feedback dummies and the row
variables). As I need to consistently estimate all of the coeﬃcients to estimate option values I do
not include game-section ﬁxed eﬀects, but instead include home team dummies and home team*face
value and home team*expected attendance variables (based on the attendance model used in Section
3).
Competition variables are deﬁned based on listings for the same number of tickets, to the same
game and with the same face value which were available at the time the listing was posted.23 Io n l y
use listings available at the time of posting as I want to estimate the seller’s expected probability
of sale when he chooses the price: the coeﬃcients on these variables and the time dummies should
reﬂect expectations about how competition will evolve once the listing has been posted. The included
competition variables, deﬁned separately for auction and ﬁxed price listings, are the average relative
price, the minimum relative price, a count of the number of listings available, a dummy for whether
no listings are available and proportion of competing listings with seller feedback scores above 100.
The estimation sample consists of pure ﬁxed price listings made in the last 90 days before the game
with non-missing face value information.24 Experimentation indicated that the price coeﬃcients were
21The time dummies will control for the fact that a ticket listed in the last few days has less time to sell.
22I adjust the days to go dummies slightly so that they coincide with these time periods. For example, instead of 9
t o1 1d a ya n d1 2t o1 4d a yd u m m i e sIu s e9t o1 0d a ya n d1 1t o1 4d a yd u m m i e s .
23Additional variables based on broader deﬁnitions (e.g., all tickets for the same game) and narrower deﬁnitions (e.g.,
only same section) were generally insigniﬁcant when added to the speciﬁcation.
24Ii n c l u d et h eﬁxed price with personal oﬀer listings in this speciﬁcation as all of the sales which I see in this format
23sensitive to some listings with extremely high prices, so I exclude 8,018 listings (6.8% of the ﬁxed
price sample) where the ﬁxed price is more than 5 times above the face value of the ticket.
5.1.2 Pure Auction Listings
Auction listings have the additional feature that a seller’s revenues in the event of sale may be above
the start price. The probability that the listing results in a sale is modeled using a probit. The
observed revenue (Rit) in the event of a sale is modeled as a left-censored normal regression where
realizations of the latent variable R∗
it below the auction start price result in revenues equal to the start
price
R∗





= pit if R∗
it <p it
and f() is a linear function. I assume that, once I have controlled for the possible endogeneity of
prices, there is no correlation in the residual terms in the probit and censored regression functions
so that these models can consistently be estimated separately. The auction start price and revenues
are both expressed relative to face values on a per seat basis including shipping costs. The control
variables are the same as in the ﬁxed price model.
The estimation sample consists of pure auction listings made in the last 90 days before the game
with non-missing face value information and no secret reserve prices and which the seller did not
stop before the end of the auction. To reduce the sensitivity of the speciﬁcation to outliers I drop
observations where the auction start price is greater than 4 times the face value of the ticket and
observations where the realized revenue from the auction is more than six times the face value. These
exclusions drop 3.1% of the sample.
are at the ﬁxed price.
245.1.3 Hybrid Auction Listings
Hybrid auction listings can result in no sale, an auction sale or a ﬁxed price sale. I therefore model
the probability of each outcome as being determined by a trinomial logit model with the expected
revenue in the event of an auction sale being determined by the same type of left-censored normal
regression model speciﬁed above.
The estimation sample consists of hybrid auction listings made in the last 90 days before the
game with non-missing face value information and which the seller did not stop before the end of the
auction, and where the oﬀered ﬁxed price was strictly above the auction start price, a criterion which
drops 36,248 listings.25 I also drop 9.8% of listings where the ﬁx e dp r i c ew a sm o r et h a n5t i m e sf a c e
value, the start price was more than 4 times face value or realized revenues were more than six times
face value.
5.2 Price Endogeneity and Instruments
Price will be endogenous if there are characteristics which I do not control for which make a listing
more attractive to buyers and so cause the seller to increase the price. I use instruments and a control
function approach to deal with endogeneity in the context of my non-linear models.
Equation (7) implies that variables which aﬀect or reﬂect a seller’s opportunity cost but which do
not aﬀect a listing’s attractiveness to potential buyers will be valid instruments. I deﬁne the following
instruments, interacted with dummies for the time periods of interest (e.g., 1-10 and 21-40 days prior
to the game).26
• three distance bands reﬂecting the distance of the seller’s zipcode from the stadium of the home
team (less than 40 km, 40-200 km (excluded), more than 200 km). In the cross-section distant
25Over 99% of sales for these listings are at the ﬁxed price as one would expect. However, there are small number of
auction sales above the start price which are impossible to rationalize.
26Many of these instruments are based on listings of other tickets made by the same seller. These variables are
obviously not deﬁned for sellers listing only one set of tickets. I therefore also include dummies for listings by these
sellers. As I only know the seller’s zipcode when he makes at least one sale of some type of event ticket I only deﬁne
these instruments when the seller makes at least 10 MLB listings (in 99% of these cases I observe a zipcode somewhere
in the data including from non-MLB transactions) and I include a dummy for sellers with less than 10 listings.
25sellers may tend to have diﬀerent characteristics to ones who are more local (e.g., season ticket
holders are likely to live close by) and these groups may have diﬀerent opportunity costs. My
assumption is that included variables such as feedback scores will control for aspects of seller
quality valued by buyers. Distant sellers are also likely to have fewer oﬄine opportunities to
dispose of tickets close to the time of the game (e.g., to sell the tickets to coworkers or to sell
them outside the stadium) so are likely to cut prices more dramatically right before the game;
• the proportion of the seller’s unsold listings during the same time period (for other tickets) which
are relisted (at a later date) on Market 2. Frequent relisting may reﬂect either high opportunity
costs of sale (because the costs of relisting are low) or low opportunity costs (because the seller
has few opportunities to sell the tickets oﬄine);27
• the proportion of listings for other tickets by the same seller in the same time period in ﬁxed
price and hybrid auction formats. Sellers with diﬀerent opportunity costs might tend to use
diﬀerent types of listing, and they may be more willi n gt om a i n t a i nl i s t i n g su n s o l di ft h e yh a v e
lower costs of using that type of listing; and
• for hybrid auction listings, the average ﬁxed price and average auction start price set by the
seller in other hybrid listings during the same time period relative to the face value of the ticket.
Sellers who prefer an auction sale (for example, the convenience of knowing that the auction will
end on a ﬁxed date) may set a lower start price and a higher ﬁx e dp r i c e . W h i l eo n em a yb e
concerned about aspects of seller speciﬁcq u a l i t ya ﬀecting these prices, these types of instrument
are useful in providing separate variati o nf o rt h et w op r i c e ss e tb yt h es e l l e r .
The non-linearity of the models and the large number of price coeﬃcients and other control
variables require me to use a two-step control function approach (e.g., Rivers and Vuong (1988),
Wooldridge (2002), p. 472ﬀ).28 For the ﬁxed price probit model, the control function approach
27Relistings are identiﬁe db yt h es a m es e l l e rl i s t i n gt h es a m eo rs m a l l e rn u m b e ro ft i c k e t sf o rt h es a m eg a m e ,s e c t i o n
and row on a date after a listing which did not result in a sale;
28A Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) approach would be more eﬃcient. However this is diﬃcult to
26assumes that the latent variable (Q∗
it,Q it =1if Q∗
it ≥ 0) determining the probability of sale can be
expressed by
Q∗
it = f Xitθ1 + pitθ2 + uit (10)
where f Xit contains all the exogenous variables. Prices are assumed to be determined by linear
equations of the form
pit = f Xitγ1 + Zitγ2 + vit (11)
where Zit are the instruments excluded, by assumption, from the Q∗
it function. uit and vit are mean
zero bivariate normal, and prices are endogenous if uit and vit are correlated. The two-step procedure
exploits the fact that under joint normality of u and v and the normalization that var(u)=1
uit = vitθ3 + eit (12)
where θ3 =
Cov(u,v)
Var(v) and e is normal and independent of e X, Z and v.I n t h e ﬁrst step OLS is used to
estimate (11) yielding estimates of the vs. These b vs are included in the second-step probit equation
to give scaled estimates of the θ parameters.29 The signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients on b v provides
a test of whether there is an endogeneity problem. I calculate standard errors using a bootstrap
procedure to account for the two-step estimation procedure. The bootstrap resamples games to allow
for within-game correlations in the residuals.
A similar control function approach can be used for the probit and censored regression (Wooldridge
(2002), p. 530) models used for pure auction listings, and the censored regression model used for hybrid
auction listings. Addressing endogeneity in the context of the trinomial logit model used to determine
the probability of each outcome in the hybrid auction model is theoretically more diﬃcult because
the unobservables are assumed not to be normally distributed. Following the “practical” approach
suggested by Wooldridge (2007) I specify that the latent utility-like variable associated with outcome
estimate with several endogenous variables (the diﬀerent price-time period interaction coeﬃcients). If I include only the
main price eﬀect the two-step and FIML approaches give very similar coeﬃcients (when they are rescaled appropriately).
29The probit coeﬃcients have to be scaled because the variance of e is 1−corr(u,v)
2 rather than 1.
27j as
uijt = g Xijtθ1 + pijtθ2 + vijtθ3 + eijt (13)
where eijt is distributed Type I extreme value and the vijts come from price equations like (11). Given
this ad-hoc assumption we can proceed as before estimating the b vsi naﬁrst-step and then including
them in the second stage speciﬁcation.
Table 7 shows the coeﬃcients on the instruments in the ﬁrst-stage regressions. The instruments
are jointly signiﬁcant and most of the coeﬃcients show plausible patterns, while providing some
evidence that diﬀerent types of sellers select into diﬀerent mechanisms. This is not a problem as long
as the selection characteristics are not valued by buyers. The distance coeﬃcients show that as a
game approaches sellers located more than 200 km from the stadium tend to cut their prices more,
and sellers located within 40 km to cut them slightly less, than those located between 40 and 200
km. This is consistent with distant sellers having fewer oﬄine opportunities to sell tickets at the last
minute. Sellers who tend to use pure ﬁxed price or hybrid auction listings tend to set higher prices
than other sellers when using these listings. This is consistent with these sellers having lower costs of
maintaining these listings. This price premium disappears right before the game, presumably because
at that point the seller’s primary concern is to sell his tickets as soon as possible, and this may be
particularly true for professional sellers, who appear to make more use of ﬁxed price listings, as they
are less likely to attend games themselves. The proportion resale variables show a less consistent
pattern across sale formats. For hybrid auction listings, frequent relisting is associated with higher
prices a long time before the game with the premium disappearing over time. This is consistent
with these sellers having low listing costs but being increasingly keen to sell as the game approaches.
For ﬁxed price listings, frequent relisting is associated with lower prices, consistent with these sellers
having more limited outside opportunities than other users of ﬁxed prices.
It is also possible to try to control for the endogeneity of competitor prices. I create instruments
for these prices by taking averages of the ﬁrst three types of instruments listed above across the
28competing listings which are used to construct the competition variables. In practice, controlling for
the endogeneity of competitors’ prices has only small eﬀects on the results.
5.3 Second Stage Results, Implied Opportunity Costs and Counterfactuals
5.3.1 Fixed Price Listings
Column (1) in Table 8 shows the price coeﬃcients from the probit speciﬁcation without controlling for
endogeneity. Demand slopes downwards but the average price elasticities (shown at the bottom of the
table) imply that, on average, sellers are pricing below the revenue-maximizing level. This changes
in column (2) when I use the control function to address price endogeneity, and the (unreported)
coeﬃcients on the b vs are also positive and signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients on the interactions between
a listing’s own price and the time period variables are small in magnitude, indicating that the slope
of the demand curve is similar across time periods. In both speciﬁcations, the absolute value of
the elasticities decrease over time, consistent with sellers moving down the demand curve as their
opportunity costs fall.
The speciﬁcation in column (3) also controls for the endogeneity of competitor prices. Most of the
coeﬃcients are similar to those in column (2). The coeﬃcients on the mean relative price, number
and feedback quality of competing ﬁxed price listings are consistent with substitution across listings.
The competition eﬀects for auction listings are generally smaller in size and less signiﬁcant. This is
also true for the other models reported below.30
Figure 3(a) how the distribution of opportunity costs evolves over time, based on the Table 8
column (3) coeﬃcients. Opportunity costs fall as the game approaches consistent with dynamic
pricing models. To reduce clutter the ﬁgure only shows standard errors on the density estimates
for the ﬁrst time period. The density is estimated precisely and this is also true for the other time
periods and models.
30Recall that the variables reﬂect the state of competition at the time the listing is posted (and the price is set) not at
each point in time while the listing is available. The greater signiﬁcance of the ﬁxed price listing competition variables
may reﬂect the fact that these listings tend to remain available (often at the same prices) for a greater period of time.
29Table 9(a) reports the results of the counterfactual experiment. For each listing I take the
opportunity cost implied by the estimated model and calculate what the optimal price would have
been if the demand curve was the same as the one estimated 11-14 days before the game (this involves
using the slope of the demand curve 11-20 days before the game and the intercept for 11-14 days before
the game). As the number of competing listings also tends to increase over time and competition
may also depress prices I also assume that, for all listings, the competition variables take the average
of their values 11-20 days before the game. I can then compare the path of the counterfactual prices
to the path of observed prices. If they are very similar, which is the case in Table 9(a), then I can
conclude that changes in demand or competition are not signiﬁcant causes of declining prices (because
these are held ﬁxed in the counterfactual), which must instead be explained by declining opportunity
costs.
One aspect of the results which may suggest misspeciﬁcation is that a relatively large proportion
of implied opportunity costs are negative, especially in the period immediately before the game. An
alternative speciﬁcation which implies few negative opportunity costs is based on log prices because
the probability of sale becomes very sensitive to price when prices are low. Figure 3(b) shows the
resulting distribution of opportunity costs, and even in the immediately before the game less than 5%
of opportunity costs are negative. Table 9(b) shows that the qualitative results from the counterfactual
are unchanged using the log speciﬁcation.31
5.3.2 Pure Auction Listings
Column (1) of Table 10 shows the results from the probit model used to model the probability that
the listing results in a sale. In this case the price and time period interactions are statistically
signiﬁcant and indicate that the sale probability is less sensitive to price more than 41 days before
31Given these results one might prefer the log speciﬁcation to the one based on relative prices. However, when
the auction models are estimated using log prices a signiﬁcant proportion (as high as 20% in some speciﬁcations) of
the observed prices do not satisfy the second-order conditions for payoﬀ-maximization given any opportunity costs. I
therefore prefer to focus on the relative price results throughout. For auction models the qualitative counterfactual
results are similar across the log and relative price speciﬁcations if one only uses observations which satisfy the second-
order conditions.
30the game. However, the average absolute value of the probability of sale elasticities still falls as the
game approaches.32 They are similar in the last two time periods which is consistent with auction
start prices being fairly ﬂat in the last two weeks before the game (Table 5 column (2)).
The revenue function estimates the sensitivity of expected revenues conditional on a sale to the
auction start price and, on average, a $1 increase in the start price raises expected revenues in the event
of a sale by $0.51. The negative price interaction coeﬃcient for the ﬁnal (1-10) time period implies
that the revenues are less sensitive to the start price immediately before the game. This aﬀects the
estimated opportunity costs and the counterfactual (Table 9(c)): opportunity costs and counterfactual
prices are both estimated to increase in the ﬁnal time period, having fallen previously. While it is
not obvious why the revenue function should change in the ﬁnal time period, selection provides a
plausible explanation for why the opportunity costs of sellers using auctions might increase. Suppose
that there is a distribution of opportunity costs across sellers and the opportunity cost of each seller
falls over time. If high opportunity cost sellers initially use ﬁxed price listings, which is consistent
with these listings having a relatively low probability of sale but they later switch to using auctions as
they become keener to sell, while low opportunity cost sellers always use auctions then the average or
median opportunity cost of sellers using auctions might increase. Consistent with this type of shift,
Figure 1(c) shows that the proportion of pure auction listings resulting in sales falls in the last ten
days.
5.3.3 Hybrid Auction Listings
Table 11 shows the estimated coeﬃcients from the estimated trinomial logit and censored normal
models used to model the outcomes of hybrid auction listings. In both cases the control function
approach is used to control for the possible endogeneity of own and competitor prices. To save space
Id on o tr e p o r tt h ec o e ﬃcients on the competition variables but they are qualitatively similar to those
32The absolute value of the sale elasticities can be less than 1 in absolute magnitude without implying that prices
are below the revenue-maximizing level because in auctions expected revenues conditional on sale may not increase
dollar-for-dollar with the start price.
31for the earlier models.
As expected, higher auction start prices reduce the probability of auction sales, while higher ﬁxed
prices reduce the probability of ﬁxed price sales. The revenue function coeﬃcient on the start price
interaction for the ﬁnal (1-10) time period is positive, implying that a seller has more incentive to
raise prices immediately before a game. This is, of course, the opposite of the eﬀect found in the pure
auction model. Higher ﬁxed prices increase expected revenues in the event of an auction sale which
is sensible because when the ﬁxed price is higher, potential buyers with higher valuations are more
likely to reject the ﬁx e dp r i c ea n db i di nt h ea u c t i o n .
The median opportunity costs implied by the auction start price decline monotonically as the
game approaches. One can also calculate the opportunity costs implied by the chosen ﬁxed price.
Because the estimated elasticities of sale with respect to the ﬁxed price are relatively small and higher
ﬁxed prices increase expected auction sale revenues, observed ﬁxed prices can only be rationalized
by negative opportunity costs. They are also diﬀerent from those implied by the auction model
which indicates some type of misspeciﬁcation. However, the implied opportunity costs still show a
monotonic decline as the game approaches (the median opportunity cost relative to face value falls
from -0.18 more than 41 days before the game, to -1.11, -1.92 and -2.26 in following time periods).
Table 9(d) shows the results of performing the counterfactual for auction start prices. In this case
the counterfactual price declines are slightly larger than those observed in the data, which implies
that changes in demand actually tend to lead prices increasing over time, while falling opportunity
costs drive the declining price pattern.
5.3.4 Summary of Results
Overall the results support the hypothesis that prices decline because of falling opportunity costs,
consistent with dynamic pricing models. The only exception arises for the ﬁnal time period in the
pure auction model, which also happens to be the one case where we do not observe a clear price
decline and the proportion of listings resulting in sales actually tends to fall. This exception may
32reﬂect selection of sellers into diﬀerent mechanisms.
The analysis has treated diﬀerent types of listing separately. However, one can combine the
opportunity cost estimates from the diﬀerent models to look at what happens to costs for individual
seller-ticket combinations as the game approaches. When one observes a seller listing tickets for the
same game, section and row on diﬀerent days, the implied opportunity cost falls over time in 68%
of cases where the seller is using the same type of mechanism so the estimates come from the same
model, while it falls in 66% of cases where the seller is using diﬀerent mechanisms so that the estimates
come from a diﬀerent model. The fact that opportunity costs tend to fall in both cases is consistent
with the theory and the similarity of these numbers provides some evidence in favor of the assumed
speciﬁcations.
6 Why Do Some People Purchase Early if Prices Are Expected to
Fall?
A potential puzzle is why some consumers choose to purchase early if prices are expected to fall.
This issue has been considered in some of the most recent theoretical literature on dynamic pricing of
perishable goods (e.g., Liu and van Ryzin (2008)) - previous models had assumed away the possibility
of strategically timed purchases - where the roles of uncertainty about future availability, buyer risk
aversion and search costs in explaining why some consumers may purchase early at higher prices have
been emphasized. In this section, I examine this issue by calibrating a particular model of buyer
utility. I show that early purchases can be explained by uncertainty about the future availability of
particular kinds of ticket (e.g., blocks of four seats) combined with plausible valuations and return
to market costs. I also show that there are some patterns in the data which are consistent with
uncertainty and return to market costs being important. Throughout I assume that buyers are aware
that prices tend to decline - an assessment of whether this is true or not is left to future research.
336.1 Models of Buyer Utility with Uncertain Future Availability and Prices, Search
Costs and Risk/Loss Aversion
Suppose that there are two periods and that consumer i’s choice is between buying a ticket which she
values at v1i in period 1 at price p1 (v1i ≥ p1) or waiting until period 2. Waiting entails a return to
market cost si and, if she buys a ticket when she returns, she gets net surplus v2i − p2 which (from
her perspective in period 1) has pdf f2i(v2i − p2). If she is risk neutral she will purchase in period 1
i fa n do n l yi f
v1i − p1 ≥− si +
Z ∞
0
(v2i − p2)f2i(v2i − p2)d(v2i − p2) (14)
where the RHS reﬂects the fact that the ticket is only purchased in period 2 if v2i − p2 ≥ 0.H i g h e r
search costs, lower expected availability and higher expected future prices and lower period 1 prices
will make her more inclined to purchase early. Alternatively her preferences may display constant
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and p2 ≤ vi. Greater risk aversion will tend to favor an earlier purchase when future prices and
availability are uncertain. Modeling consumers as being risk-averse may be unattractive in this
setting because the dollar amounts involved are relatively small compared with lifetime consumption
risks (Rabin and Thaler (2001), Rabin (2000)). An alternative speciﬁcation therefore assumes risk-
neutrality but allows for the consumer to suﬀer an additional utility loss li if she delays purchasing
but ends up with a deal which is worse than the one she would have got in the ﬁrst period (i.e., her
34preferences show a form of loss aversion)
v1i − p1 ≥− si +
Z ∞
0




lif2i(v2i − p2)d(v2i − p2)
In this section I will assess how many observed early purchase decisions (in the model people who
choose to buy in period 1) can be rationalized for diﬀerent values of si,α i and li, making a variety of
assumptions about consumers’ valuations and their willingness to substitute across diﬀerent types of
listings.
6.2 Deﬁning Consumer Preferences and Evaluating Early Purchases
Calibrating the model entails making several assumptions. In this sub-section I describe these as-
sumptions and then explain in detail how I evaluate early purchases. All of the analysis uses data
from Market 2, where I can observe actual transactions.
6.2.1 Assumptions on Preferences
When Would the Buyer Return to the Market? It is unreasonable to believe that a consumer
who delays purchasing is able to constantly monitor the set of tickets which are available. I therefore
assume that, if she was to delay purchasing, a buyer would return to Market 2 once ﬁve days before
the game which is when availability on Market 2 is at its maximum and prices are close to their lowest
level.
Which Tickets Would be Considered Available Five Days Before the Game? Five days
prior the game, tickets may be available in pure auction, ﬁxed price or hybrid auction listings. To
model a buyer’s beliefs about availability and prices, it is necessary to deﬁne which of these listings
would be considered available, given the uncertainties involved in bidding in auctions. I assume that
all ﬁx e dp r i c ea n dh y b r i da u c t i o nl i stings available at midnight ﬁve days before the game are available
35to a returning buyer at the ﬁxed price. I consider two alternative assumptions about auction listings.
The ﬁrst assumption is that auctions (pure (including multi-unit) or hybrid) which end ﬁve days
before the game with no bids and no secret reserve price are available at the auction start price. The
alternative assumption is that the buyer would ignore all auction listings which is plausible because
having waited until ﬁve days before the game she may want to guarantee that she actually gets the
tickets without having to return to the market again. In practice, these diﬀerent assumptions have
relatively little eﬀect on whether any tickets are available ﬁve days before the game, but they do have
signiﬁcant eﬀects on prices because auction start prices tend to be low.
Which Tickets Would a Buyer Consider Substituting To? How Would She Value Them?
Tickets to an individual game are diﬀerentiated products, and a person who buys a seat behind
homeplate might not be willing to sit in the bleachers even if the bleacher price was very low. It is
therefore necessary to deﬁne the set of tickets which the buyer would consider substituting between
and how she would value them. Throughout I assume that a buyer would only consider going to the
same game and buying at least as many seats as she actually bought.
The ﬁrst assumption, which I will call the “better ticket” assumption, is that the buyer would only
consider buying tickets at least as good as those she actually bought, where quality is deﬁned along
three dimensions: (i) the tickets must have equal or greater face value; (ii) if the face value is equal
they must be in the same or a lower row; (iii) the seller must have a weakly higher feedback score33,
and that these tickets would give her the same utility (v1i) as the tickets she actually bought. By
ignoring the possibilities that a consumer would substitute to lower quality tickets or that she would
get more utility from better tickets, this assumption will probably err in making it too unattractive
for a buyer to wait.34
The alternative (“any ticket”) assumption is that the buyer would consider any tickets but that
33I implement this criterion using the four feedback score categories deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n3 .
34There is some indirect evidence that the better ticket assumptions is not completely unreasonable for many buyers:
when I observe people unsuccessfully bidding in auctions but later buying tickets to the same game (223,503 cases), 74%
of them buy from a sellers with at least as high feedback score and 68% of them buy tickets with at least as high face
value.
36the value she gets from these tickets varies dollar-for-dollar with their face value. Row and seller
feedback are ignored under this assumption. For example, if I observe a consumer purchasing a seat
with $60 face value for $40 and I assume that she values it at $50 then I would assume that she
would value a seat with a $40 face value at $30. As buyers are likely to purchase seats which are
particularly good matches for their preferences, this assumption is likely to err on the side of making
it too attractive for a buyer to wait.
How Does A Buyer Value The Tickets She Buys? The ﬁnal assumption concerns how a buyer
values the tickets she is observed to buy in the ﬁrst period (i.e., v1i − p1). When tickets are valued
more highly, a buyer will be more inclined to purchase early if future availability is uncertain. I allow
v1i − p1 to take on values of $10, $25, $50 and $75 per seat.
6.2.2 Evaluating Early Purchases
I now explain the steps involved in evaluating early purchases under the “better ticket” assumption.
In the case of risk-neutrality it is useful to express the right-hand side of (14) as −si + qi
R v1i
0 (v1i −
p2)g2pi(p2)dp2,w h e r eqi is the consumer’s belief that a better ticket will be available and g2pi(p2) is
the density of the price of the cheapest available better ticket. Utilities under risk aversion and loss
a v e r s i o nc a nb ee x p r e s s e di ns i m i l a rw a y s .
Step 1: Estimating a Consumer’s Expectations About Ticket Availability (qi) Ie s t i m a t e
a consumer’s expectation of whether a better ticket will be available using a probit model, where the
explanatory variables are game, ticket and listing characteristics of the tickets which the consumer
actually purchased. The sample consists of all 289,784 sets of tickets with non-missing face value
information which I observe ever being purchased in the Market 2 data. The dependent variable is
whether a better ticket is available ﬁve days before the game.
37Step 2: Estimating a Consumer’s Expectations About Future Ticket Prices Under the
assumption that a consumer receives utility v1i from any better ticket, she will purchase the cheapest
better ticket available. I model the price of the cheapest better ticket (conditional on a better ticket
being available) as being drawn from a two-parameter gamma distribution where the parameters are
linear functions of observed ticket, listing and game characteristics
p2 ∼ Γ(k,θ) where k =e x p ( X0β0),θ=e x p ( X1β1)
I estimate the parameters using the 255,885 observations on ever purchased tickets with non-missing
face value information where a better ticket was available ﬁve days before the game. The price is
deﬁned per seat purchased so that if two seats were bought but the only available better tickets are
in a three seat listing for $180 then the price per seat purchased would be $90.
Table 12 shows some of the coeﬃcients from the estimated probit and gamma models, assuming
that both ﬁxed price and auction listings (with no bidders) are available. On average, better tickets
are available for 88% of listings (this high availability reﬂects the fact that most purchased tickets are
for popular games which have a lot of listings), and the average price of the cheapest available better
ticket is $42.59 per seat. The coeﬃcients themselves show a sensible pattern with, for example, less
availability and higher prices for purchased listings with more seats, higher face values (at least for
face values covered by almost all of the data) and better rows. Interestingly, availability is higher for
games with higher expected attendance indicating that the supply curve in the secondary market is
upward sloping, although conditional on expected attendance, it is lower on weekends than during the
week (which is consistent with season ticket holders having more time to go to games on weekends).
Step 3: Evaluating Observed Early Purchases The predicted availability of better tickets from
the estimated probit model and the estimated price distribution are used to evaluate the inequalities
(14), (15) and (16) using assumed values for v1i − p1, si, αi and li for each observed early purchase.
Id e ﬁne early purchases as those being made more than ten days before the game is played. If the
38inequality holds then the early purchase is said to be rationalized.
6.2.3 Results Under the Better Ticket Assumption
The top section of Table 13 presents the results of the analysis assuming that a waiting buyer would
consider auction listings with no bidders to be available. The ﬁr s tl i n es h o w st h ep r o p o r t i o no fe a r l y
purchases which can be rationalized with no search costs, risk neutrality and no loss aversion for
diﬀerent buyer valuations. If a buyer gets a surplus of $25 per seat from the tickets she actually
buys then 41% of observed early purchase decisions are rationalized. These are a combination of
buyers who purchase early but happen to ﬁnd relatively low prices and buyers who purchase tickets
for which substitutes are relatively unlikely to be available at a later date. For example, 79% of early
purchases of three or more seats are rationalized if surplus is $25 per seat, compared with only 35%
of purchases of pairs. As surplus increases, buyers stand to lose more if tickets are not available so a
greater proportion of purchases are rationalized.
The next three lines show how the results change as return to market costs are increased, with risk
neutrality and no loss aversion. When return to market costs are above $25 the vast majority of early
purchases can be rationalized even without needing to assume that consumers get high surplus. This
reﬂects the fact that the expected price gain to delaying until ﬁve days before the game is generally
less than $25. The ﬁnal four lines show the eﬀects of introducing risk or loss aversion without
return to market costs and then combining $25 per seat return to market costs with some risk or
loss aversion. With a coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion of 0.05 a person would be indiﬀerent to
accepting a gamble with a 0.62 probability of winning $10 and a 0.38 probability of losing $10. Risk
aversion has a particularly large eﬀect on the desire to purchase early when buyers are assumed to get
a lot of surplus. On the other hand, when combined with return to market costs, both risk and loss
aversion can rationalize almost all observed early purchasing even when surplus is lower (e.g., $25 or
$50 per ticket).
The next section of the table shows the eﬀects of assuming that only ﬁxed price listings are
39available. Making this assumption actually only has a small average eﬀect on predicted availability
(the average b qi falls by around one percentage point) but it has a large eﬀect on expected prices
because ﬁxed prices are generally higher than the start prices of auctions (even those with no bidders)
so the cheapest better ticket price tends to increase. As a result the majority of observed purchases
are rationalized for lower return to market costs or risk/loss aversion parameters.
6.2.4 Results Under the Any Ticket Assumption
The last two sections of Table 13 present the results under the assumption that consumers would
consider purchasing any ticket to the same game with the same number of seats, and that their
valuations of tickets would vary one-for-one with face values. As a result, a waiting consumer would
buy the ticket with the lowest price relative to the ticket’s face value (i.e., the lowest pMKT 2
2 −pFACE
2 ).
This relative price can be negative so I model the lowest price as being drawn from a normal rather
than a gamma distribution. As before, ticket availability is modeled using a probit although under
the any ticket assumption average availability is very high (the average b qi is 0.98 even when only
tickets at ﬁxed prices are considered to be available).
The result of allowing consumers to substitute to a wider variety of tickets is that fewer early
purchases are rationalized for any value of the return to market, risk or loss aversion parameters.
The main insight is that plausible values of risk or loss aversion alone cannot rationalize the majority
of purchases for plausible values of buyer surplus. This is especially true for two seat purchases which
make up the vast majority of the sample (for 4 or more seats 40% of purchases are still justiﬁed with
$25 surplus and no return to market costs or risk or loss aversion). On the other hand, once one
allows for $50 return to market costs or $25 return to market costs combined with some risk aversion
around two-thirds of early purchases can be rationalized.
406.3 Supporting Evidence: Who Buys Early?
The calibration exercise showed that early purchasing can be rationalized by return to market costs of
$25-$50 per seat or high valuations for tickets where there is a reasonable probability that substitute
tickets may not be available close to the game (e.g., people buying four or more seats). This leads to
testable implications about which types of buyers should buy tickets early (those likely to have high
return to market costs) and the types of tickets which should be purchased earlier (those which are
likely to have fewer substitutes for some subset of consumers).
For online markets the time costs involved in returning to the market at a later date are likely
to be relatively small. However, there may be signiﬁcant other costs involved in waiting to buy.
For example, “complementary investments” (booking hotels or plane tickets, ﬁnding baby-sitters,
coordinating with friends) which must be made to attend the game may be more signiﬁcantly expensive
(or diﬃcult) if they are made at the last minute and when ticket availability is not certain people
will be unwilling to make these investments before buying game tickets. A plausible assumption
is that people who live further away from the stadium tend to have to make larger complementary
investments, on average, to attend a game. Consistent with this story, early purchasers tend to live
further away from the stadium where the game is played. Table 14(a) shows the results of regressing
the log of the distance that buyers live from the stadium on the same variables that were used in the
price regressions in Section 3 including game-section ﬁxed eﬀects. The mean (median) distance is
295 (59) km.35 On average, buyers who buy 30-32 days before a game live 73% further away from
the stadium than people who buy 0-2 days before the game. The proportional eﬀect is similar using
diﬀerent ﬁxed eﬀects, a least absolute deviations estimator to look at median distances and when
controlling for buyer experience. An interesting ﬁnding which suggests that early purchasing is not
driven purely by ignorance of observed price declines, is that controlling for distance, more experienced
buyers are not signiﬁcantly more likely to buy closer to the game.
35T h er e g r e s s i o ne x c l u d e s3 , 8 2 1o b s e r v a t i o n sw h e r eIw a su n a b l et oc a l c u l a t et h ed i s t a n c ee i t h e rb e c a u s et h eb u y e r
zipcode was missing or I was unable to calculate the distance (e.g., Canadian buyers).
41Table 14(b) reports the results of regressing the number of days to go when the transaction takes
place on ticket and game characteristics (controlling for buyer distance eﬀects using a third-order
polynomial in distance and a dummy for buyers living within 40 km of the stadium). Four and six
seat listings are less likely to be available than pairs and consistent with the model these listings tend
to be purchased earlier. Three and ﬁve seat listings show the opposite eﬀect, but this may be due to
people who want smaller listings (two or four seats) buying these listings close to the game when they
fear that suitable listings for their ideal number of seats will not become available. Better rows (ﬁrst
or second row, or lower row number) also tend to be purchased earlier (even though Figure 1(d) shows
that the average row quality of available listings tends to increase as the game approaches) consistent
with some consumers having strong preferences to sit at the front of a section. One surprising feature
is that higher face value tickets tend to be purchased closer to the game.
Controlling for team eﬀects, tickets to games with higher expected attendance tend to be purchased
earlier. This is consistent with buyers perceiving that there is more competition for these tickets,
combining the primary and secondary markets, even though these games have more secondary market
listings. There may also be more consumers with very high valuations for these games which would
also rationalize earlier purchasing.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has examined a striking feature of prices in online resale markets for MLB tickets: they
tend to fall signiﬁcantly as a game approaches. The falling price pattern exists for both posted and
transaction prices and it is similar across teams, demand conditions and cheap and expensive seats
and across diﬀerent trading mechanisms. Consistent with theoretical models of dynamic pricing for
perishable goods, sellers cut prices as a game approaches because their future selling opportunities
disappear. My ﬁnding that these theoretical models accurately describe the behavior of sellers who
do not typically employ complex revenue management systems, contrasts with the results of previous
attempts to test these models using data from the airline industry.
42The paper also examines why some buyers purchase a long time before the game when prices are
expected to fall. Until very recently, this question has been ignored by the theoretical literature
which assumed that buyers could not time their purchases strategically. Under the assumption that
consumers are aware of the expected price declines, I show that the majority of observed early purchase
decisions can be justiﬁed by plausible ticket valuations and return to market costs, possibly combined
with some degree of risk- or loss-aversion.
Two questions seem ripe for further analysis. First, why are pricing patterns in this market
diﬀerent from those observed in airline markets and possibly markets for other perishable goods such
as hotel rooms and spots on radio and television stations? A possible demand-side explanation is
that, compared with resale markets for MLB tickets, it may be much more likely that a customer
arriving close to the end will have high a valuation. This seems particularly plausible for airlines and
hotels. An alternative supply-side explanation is that market concentration and repeated interaction
between the same buyers and sellers provides incentives for sellers to commit or build reputations for
not reducing their prices, and I have heard this type of argument made for the sale of spots by radio
stations.
The second question concerns what aﬀects sellers’ choices over which market and which trading
mechanism to use. A nice feature of my data is that I observe sellers switching from one mechanism
to another as the game approaches, presumably because some mechanism characteristics, such as the
price ﬂexibility oﬀered by auctions, are more valuable when sellers are really keen to sell. On the
other hand, buyers may prefer the certainty oﬀered by ﬁxed price purchases when there is little time
remaining. Understanding how diﬀerent trading mechanisms are valued by both buyers and sellers
potentially has implications far beyond the type of online resale market considered here.
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48Average Stubhub  Market 2 Market 2 Market 2 Market 2 Mean $ Market 2 Mean $ Median Distance
Attendance As % of # listings # listings # transactions HHI*10,000Transaction Price Face Value of of Buyer from
Max Attendance Per Seat Purchased Tickets Stadium (Miles)
Arizona Diamondbacks 0.57 91,758 4,883 2,246 186 42.01 39.97 15.5 6 20.6
Atlanta Braves 0.63 150,956 15,913 8,124 260 41.80 35.34 18.3 9 103.3
Baltimore Orioles 0.55 146,770 17,159 6,889 83 62.73 37.20 32.3 14 70.4
Boston Red Sox 0.99 342,658 65,016 35,907 39 106.38 38.25 37.8 18 56.1
Chicago White Sox 0.85 257,272 33,701 15,440 150 42.33 34.57 34.5 12 24.9
Chicago Cubs 0.96 485,003 52,508 25,755 13 67.52 29.45 24.1 11 42.9
Cincinnatti Reds 0.59 32,426 16,882 7,968 151 40.63 27.73 22.7 10 67.4
Cleveland Indians 0.68 57,438 15,306 7,879 218 40.34 29.06 19.1 9 46.8
Colorado Rockies 0.59 33,714 3,484 1,815 226 45.38 N/A 21.8 11 53.1
Detroit Tigers 0.85 227,020 36,595 17,276 97 41.10 23.16 23.6 9 36.5
Florida Marlins 0.40 8,134 1,673 859 666 36.01 33.74 7.9 5 22.3
Houston Astros 0.85 100,240 10,225 5,650 82 48.02 31.32 14.1 6 27.2
Kansas City Royals 0.48 19,928 4,702 2,237 223 41.57 22.89 18.1 8 54.8
Los Angeles Angels 0.94 238,824 34,485 16,605 54 38.39 24.50 16.9 6 19.5
Los Angeles Dodgers 0.85 216,623 43,382 21,730 121 38.24 45.33 17.2 6 19.7
Milwaukee Brewers 0.78 27,650 14,743 8,845 202 34.36 26.40 17.9 8 51.7
Minnesota Twins 0.59 23,173 3,170 1,523 297 36.65 32.32 11.6 6 27.7
New York Mets 0.84 201,669 30,964 13,051 52 52.11 34.27 18.2 8 24.4
New York Yankees 0.96 579,124 103,569 41,192 26 54.19 56.63 28.4 12 44.6
Oakland Athletics 0.68 37,773 4,343 1,845 109 46.59 33.71 15.5 8 42.6
Philadelphia Phillies 0.85 92,735 11,323 5,993 66 60.23 33.43 21.0 10 28.7
Pittsburgh Pirates 0.58 20,992 2,871 1,972 286 30.69 22.79 23.5 12 39.7
San Diego Padres 0.77 82,755 11,399 5,078 166 55.37 35.34 19.3 6 31.3
San Francisco Giants 0.91 334,489 28,349 12,744 45 46.04 34.05 21.9 8 45.9
Seattle Mariners 0.71 62,792 5,423 2,883 156 51.82 37.39 15.3 9 42.8
St Louis Cardinals 0.95 260,886 42,521 19,418 48 50.33 35.51 27.6 12 91.4
Tampa Bay Devil Rays 0.45 14,445 2,518 1,245 298 50.88 39.53 18.6 8 63.0
Texas Rangers 0.58 47,675 12,035 5,261 227 34.45 33.35 13.6 6 28.8
Toronto Blue Jays 0.58 19,606 2,161 698 862 44.91 44.07 24.1 11 196.3
Washington Nationals 0.60 117,399 5,914 2,251 204 34.55 44.20 17.6 7 24.7
Totals 4,331,927 637,217 298,128
Notes: HHI is calculated based on the number of transactions.  Mean face value is calculated based on seating sections for which single-game prices can be identified. Transaction price
is the price paid by buyers including shipping.
Market 2 Mean, Median
# of Days Purchase
Prior to Game
Table 1: Summary Statistics By TeamNo. of Seats Stubhub Market 2 Market 2 No. of No. of
in Listing # listings # listings # transactions Listings Transactions
1 50,490 5,314 2,576 Single-Unit Auction
2 1,708,002 554,038 260,216  Auction no BIN option 235,075 146,122
3 231,889 10,908 4,928  Auction with BIN option 207,221
4 1,863,810 56,794 29,443       sold by BIN option 51,711
5 88,985 3,077 1,245       sold by auction 48,878
6 388,751 3,907 1,971
Multi-Unit Auction 8,129 1,541
Personal Offer 7,926 1,525
(all sold at fixed price)
Fixed Price Format
 Store Fixed Price 46,864 7,861
 Non-Store Fixed Price 128,823 42,741
Stubhub Listings No. of Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max No. of Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev
Buyer Price 67,517,910 102.17 87.8 3.05 999.75 66,236,993 38.96 26.87 5 312 2.74 1.89
Seller Price 67,517,910 75.47 67.83 0.0085 769.25 66,236,993 38.96 26.87 5 312 1.99 1.45
Market 2 Transactions
Buyer Price 300,379 54.94 53.75 0.0025 959.5 290,360 36.48 32.8 5 312 1.77 1.64
Seller Price 300,379 49.46 51.38 0.0023 918.39 290,360 36.48 32.8 5 312 1.57 1.56
Market 2 Listing Prices
Auction Start Price 450,425 34.93 50.94 0.0017 1000 432,661 36.67 33.7 5 312 1.04 1.39
Fixed Price 390,834 69.88 71.28 0.005 1000 376,325 39.64 39.98 5 312 2.13 1.99
  excluding seller commission 390,834 67.13 68.82 0.0045 967.38 376,325 39.64 39.98 5 312 2.04 1.92
Notes: seller prices exclude commissions.  Buyer prices include commissions paid by buyer and shipping costs.  Primary market prices are calculted based on sections for which single-game prices 
can be identified.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Secondary/Primary Price
Sales Mechanism on Market 2 Number of Seats Per Listing
Secondary Market Prices, $ per seat Primary Market (Face Value) Prices, $ per seat(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Sample All All All All Face not missing Face <= $20 Face >=$45 Exp Att > 95% Exp Att 85-95% Exp Att 75-85% Exp Att <75%
Dep. Var Log(Seller Price) Log(Seller Price) Seller Price $ Log(Buyer Price) Seller/Face  Log(Buyer Price) Log(Buyer Price) Log(Buyer Price) Log(Buyer Price) Log(Buyer Price) Log(Buyer Price)
Day to Go Dummies (0-2 excluded)
3 to 5 days 0.0727*** 0.0954*** 4.558*** 0.0954*** 0.114*** 0.104*** 0.0956*** 0.0538*** 0.0891*** 0.104*** 0.120***
(0.0046) (0.0042) (0.3100) (0.0036) (0.0092) (0.0110) (0.0055) (0.0088) (0.0073) (0.0100) (0.0074)
6 to 8 days 0.113*** 0.146*** 7.407*** 0.144*** 0.186*** 0.159*** 0.148*** 0.0916*** 0.144*** 0.163*** 0.178***
(0.0052) (0.0048) (0.3600) (0.0041) (0.0110) (0.0130) (0.0062) (0.0097) (0.0084) (0.0120) (0.0086)
9 to 11 days 0.142*** 0.181*** 9.317*** 0.173*** 0.239*** 0.196*** 0.182*** 0.117*** 0.179*** 0.204*** 0.215***
(0.0053) (0.0050) (0.3700) (0.0042) (0.0110) (0.0130) (0.0064) (0.0099) (0.0088) (0.0130) (0.0089)
12 to 14 days 0.162*** 0.205*** 10.69*** 0.193*** 0.273*** 0.221*** 0.206*** 0.136*** 0.203*** 0.226*** 0.242***
(0.0054) (0.0050) (0.3800) (0.0043) (0.0110) (0.0140) (0.0065) (0.0099) (0.0088) (0.0130) (0.0090)
15 to 17 days 0.175*** 0.223*** 11.54*** 0.171*** 0.296*** 0.240*** 0.224*** 0.140*** 0.218*** 0.245*** 0.269***
(0.0054) (0.0051) (0.3800) (0.0044) (0.0110) (0.0140) (0.0065) (0.0099) (0.0089) (0.0130) (0.0090)
18 to 20 days 0.187*** 0.237*** 12.33*** 0.184*** 0.318*** 0.256*** 0.237*** 0.149*** 0.231*** 0.260*** 0.289***
(0.0054) (0.0051) (0.3800) (0.0044) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0065) (0.0100) (0.0090) (0.0130) (0.0091)
21 to 23 days 0.197*** 0.249*** 13.10*** 0.194*** 0.337*** 0.265*** 0.249*** 0.153*** 0.244*** 0.271*** 0.306***
(0.0055) (0.0052) (0.3800) (0.0044) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0065) (0.0100) (0.0090) (0.0130) (0.0092)
24 to 26 days 0.204*** 0.260*** 13.70*** 0.204*** 0.357*** 0.278*** 0.256*** 0.158*** 0.256*** 0.281*** 0.320***
(0.0055) (0.0052) (0.3800) (0.0044) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0065) (0.0100) (0.0091) (0.0130) (0.0093)
27 to 29 days 0.211*** 0.269*** 14.20*** 0.212*** 0.372*** 0.292*** 0.265*** 0.164*** 0.263*** 0.293*** 0.329***
(0.0055) (0.0052) (0.3800) (0.0044) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0066) (0.0100) (0.0091) (0.0130) (0.0093)
30 to 32 days 0.217*** 0.276*** 14.66*** 0.219*** 0.384*** 0.301*** 0.273*** 0.170*** 0.270*** 0.302*** 0.340***
(0.0055) (0.0052) (0.3800) (0.0045) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0066) (0.0100) (0.0091) (0.0130) (0.0094)
33 to 35 days 0.222*** 0.283*** 15.15*** 0.225*** 0.396*** 0.309*** 0.281*** 0.173*** 0.278*** 0.314*** 0.348***
(0.0055) (0.0052) (0.3800) (0.0045) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0066) (0.0100) (0.0091) (0.0130) (0.0094)
36 to 38 days 0.229*** 0.291*** 15.65*** 0.233*** 0.411*** 0.316*** 0.286*** 0.175*** 0.287*** 0.325*** 0.358***
(0.0055) (0.0052) (0.3900) (0.0045) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0066) (0.0100) (0.0092) (0.0130) (0.0095)
39 to 41 days 0.234*** 0.297*** 16.07*** 0.238*** 0.423*** 0.323*** 0.292*** 0.177*** 0.291*** 0.331*** 0.368***
(0.0056) (0.0053) (0.3900) (0.0045) (0.0120) (0.0150) (0.0067) (0.0100) (0.0092) (0.0130) (0.0095)
42 to 44 days 0.237*** 0.302*** 16.39*** 0.242*** 0.432*** 0.328*** 0.296*** 0.182*** 0.296*** 0.337*** 0.371***
(0.0056) (0.0053) (0.3900) (0.0045) (0.0120) (0.0150) (0.0067) (0.0100) (0.0092) (0.0140) (0.0096)
45 to 47 days 0.243*** 0.308*** 16.79*** 0.248*** 0.445*** 0.337*** 0.301*** 0.188*** 0.302*** 0.345*** 0.376***
(0.0056) (0.0053) (0.3900) (0.0046) (0.0120) (0.0150) (0.0067) (0.0100) (0.0093) (0.0140) (0.0096)
48 to 50 days 0.245*** 0.312*** 17.05*** 0.252*** 0.452*** 0.343*** 0.304*** 0.191*** 0.307*** 0.350*** 0.380***
(0.0056) (0.0053) (0.3900) (0.0046) (0.0120) (0.0150) (0.0068) (0.0100) (0.0094) (0.0140) (0.0097)
51 to 55 days 0.248*** 0.317*** 17.35*** 0.257*** 0.462*** 0.351*** 0.309*** 0.197*** 0.312*** 0.354*** 0.385***
(0.0057) (0.0054) (0.3900) (0.0046) (0.0120) (0.0150) (0.0068) (0.0100) (0.0094) (0.0140) (0.0097)
56 to 60 days 0.251*** 0.322*** 17.73*** 0.262*** 0.474*** 0.358*** 0.313*** 0.201*** 0.318*** 0.359*** 0.390***
(0.0057) (0.0054) (0.4000) (0.0046) (0.0120) (0.0150) (0.0068) (0.0110) (0.0095) (0.0140) (0.0098)
61 to 70 days 0.256*** 0.330*** 18.30*** 0.269*** 0.490*** 0.365*** 0.319*** 0.209*** 0.323*** 0.370*** 0.400***
(0.0058) (0.0055) (0.4000) (0.0047) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0069) (0.0110) (0.0096) (0.0140) (0.0099)
71 to 80 days 0.260*** 0.339*** 18.95*** 0.278*** 0.509*** 0.378*** 0.326*** 0.213*** 0.333*** 0.380*** 0.412***
(0.0059) (0.0056) (0.4100) (0.0048) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0070) (0.0110) (0.0098) (0.0140) (0.0100)
81 plus 0.276*** 0.363*** 20.70*** 0.301*** 0.559*** 0.413*** 0.349*** 0.226*** 0.355*** 0.412*** 0.436***
(0.0061) (0.0058) (0.4200) (0.0050) (0.0130) (0.0160) (0.0073) (0.0110) (0.0100) (0.0150) (0.0100)
Home Team Form Variables
Games Ahead 0.00987*** 0.00102 0.589*** 0.000673 0.00933* -0.0240*** 0.00846*** -0.00454** -0.00444 -0.0290*** -0.00831
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.1700) (0.0016) (0.0056) (0.0070) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0050) (0.0064) (0.0053)
Games Back -0.0195*** -0.0185*** -0.792*** -0.0161*** -0.0264*** -0.0235*** -0.0138*** -0.0157*** -0.0124*** -0.0215*** -0.0156***
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0520) (0.0007) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0013)
Games Ahead *  -0.0000741*** -0.0000174 -0.00642*** -0.0000157 -0.0000939* 0.000183*** -0.0000889*** 0.0000205 -0.0000116 0.000191*** 0.0000657
Games to Go (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Games Back * 0.000102*** 0.0000970*** 0.00259*** 0.0000814*** 0.000108*** 0.000166*** 0.0000662*** 0.0000653*** 0.0000302** 0.000119*** 0.0000980***
Games to Go (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fixed Effects Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section
-Row -Row -Row -Row -Row -Row -Row -Row -Row -Row
Average Seller 74.48 74.48 74.48 74.48 73.5 31.35 119.32 95.93 73.71 61.83 64.44
Price $
Within R
2 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.15
Observations 3,361,062 3,361,062 3,361,062 3,361,062 3,299,714 845,651 1,107,116 828,083 1,012,336 657,482 863,161
Notes: all specifications include dummies for the number of seats in the listing (1-6), dummies for ticket characteristics (e.g., piggy back seats), away team form variables.  Specifications with game-section
fixed effects include row quality control variables.  Standard errors in parentheses clustered on the listing id number.  ***,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.  Within R2 does not include 
fixed effects.  Buyer prices include shipping costs and commissions.  Seller prices exclude commissions.
Table 3: Stubhub List Prices(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Sample All All All All Fixed Price Sales Face <= $20 Face >=$45 Exp Att > 95% Exp Att 85-95% Exp Att 75-85% Exp Att <75%
Dep. Var Log(Buyer Price) Log(Buyer Price) Log(Seller Price) Log(Buyer Price) Log(Buyer Price) Log(Buyer Price) Log(Buyer Price) Log(Buyer Price) Log(Buyer Price) Log(Buyer Price) Log(Buyer Price)
Day to Go Dummies (0-2 excluded)
3 to 5 days 0.0526*** 0.0469*** -0.0147*** 0.0746*** 0.118*** 0.0297*** 0.0345*** 0.0551*** 0.0311*** 0.0490*** 0.0858***
(0.0042) (0.0065) (0.0057) (0.0041) (0.0074) (0.0079) (0.0097) (0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0120) (0.0086)
6 to 8 days 0.0484*** 0.0618*** -0.00814 0.0768*** 0.161*** 0.0151* 0.0559*** 0.0699*** 0.0216** 0.0162 0.0788***
(0.0046) (0.0070) (0.0062) (0.0045) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0110) (0.0077) (0.0089) (0.0120) (0.0091)
9 to 11 days 0.117*** 0.122*** 0.0904*** 0.133*** 0.192*** 0.110*** 0.119*** 0.153*** 0.103*** 0.0656*** 0.117***
(0.0051) (0.0077) (0.0070) (0.0050) (0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0120) (0.0084) (0.0100) (0.0140) (0.0100)
12 to 14 days 0.136*** 0.145*** 0.114*** 0.153*** 0.208*** 0.124*** 0.119*** 0.149*** 0.125*** 0.0846*** 0.168***
(0.0057) (0.0084) (0.0077) (0.0055) (0.0100) (0.0110) (0.0130) (0.0092) (0.0110) (0.0160) (0.0110)
15 to 17 days 0.169*** 0.175*** 0.162*** 0.181*** 0.239*** 0.168*** 0.122*** 0.183*** 0.173*** 0.105*** 0.191***
(0.0062) (0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0060) (0.0110) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0099) (0.0120) (0.0170) (0.0120)
18 to 20 days 0.189*** 0.204*** 0.187*** 0.200*** 0.243*** 0.203*** 0.119*** 0.180*** 0.168*** 0.171*** 0.242***
(0.0067) (0.0093) (0.0091) (0.0065) (0.0110) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0100) (0.0130) (0.0200) (0.0140)
21 to 23 days 0.203*** 0.226*** 0.199*** 0.212*** 0.270*** 0.216*** 0.158*** 0.192*** 0.197*** 0.187*** 0.238***
(0.0073) (0.0100) (0.0099) (0.0071) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0170) (0.0110) (0.0150) (0.0210) (0.0150)
24 to 26 days 0.228*** 0.219*** 0.224*** 0.230*** 0.287*** 0.247*** 0.183*** 0.224*** 0.222*** 0.157*** 0.283***
(0.0077) (0.0110) (0.0100) (0.0075) (0.0120) (0.0150) (0.0180) (0.0120) (0.0150) (0.0220) (0.0160)
27 to 29 days 0.224*** 0.221*** 0.224*** 0.222*** 0.280*** 0.237*** 0.197*** 0.190*** 0.242*** 0.186*** 0.269***
(0.0082) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0080) (0.0130) (0.0160) (0.0190) (0.0130) (0.0160) (0.0240) (0.0160)
30 to 32 days 0.249*** 0.236*** 0.250*** 0.245*** 0.269*** 0.283*** 0.169*** 0.219*** 0.262*** 0.238*** 0.277***
(0.0087) (0.0110) (0.0120) (0.0084) (0.0140) (0.0170) (0.0200) (0.0140) (0.0180) (0.0240) (0.0180)
33 to 35 days 0.247*** 0.250*** 0.257*** 0.240*** 0.249*** 0.283*** 0.190*** 0.220*** 0.241*** 0.250*** 0.293***
(0.0091) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0089) (0.0140) (0.0170) (0.0200) (0.0140) (0.0190) (0.0270) (0.0190)
36 to 38 days 0.243*** 0.242*** 0.249*** 0.241*** 0.285*** 0.250*** 0.189*** 0.213*** 0.274*** 0.204*** 0.268***
(0.0099) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0096) (0.0160) (0.0190) (0.0240) (0.0150) (0.0200) (0.0290) (0.0200)
39 to 41 days 0.264*** 0.262*** 0.269*** 0.252*** 0.278*** 0.300*** 0.211*** 0.225*** 0.288*** 0.250*** 0.310***
(0.0100) (0.0130) (0.0140) (0.0100) (0.0160) (0.0190) (0.0240) (0.0150) (0.0210) (0.0290) (0.0230)
42 to 44 days 0.255*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.246*** 0.269*** 0.267*** 0.171*** 0.206*** 0.271*** 0.249*** 0.317***
(0.0110) (0.0140) (0.0150) (0.0100) (0.0160) (0.0210) (0.0240) (0.0160) (0.0210) (0.0300) (0.0240)
45 to 47 days 0.242*** 0.245*** 0.247*** 0.234*** 0.259*** 0.255*** 0.195*** 0.218*** 0.274*** 0.189*** 0.263***
(0.0110) (0.0140) (0.0150) (0.0110) (0.0170) (0.0210) (0.0260) (0.0160) (0.0230) (0.0310) (0.0250)
48 to 50 days 0.235*** 0.225*** 0.244*** 0.232*** 0.270*** 0.288*** 0.142*** 0.217*** 0.236*** 0.171*** 0.297***
(0.0120) (0.0150) (0.0160) (0.0110) (0.0180) (0.0230) (0.0280) (0.0180) (0.0240) (0.0340) (0.0250)
51 to 55 days 0.228*** 0.223*** 0.229*** 0.214*** 0.254*** 0.264*** 0.153*** 0.189*** 0.243*** 0.184*** 0.299***
(0.0100) (0.0130) (0.0140) (0.0097) (0.0150) (0.0190) (0.0230) (0.0150) (0.0200) (0.0300) (0.0230)
56 to 60 days 0.230*** 0.236*** 0.241*** 0.221*** 0.258*** 0.235*** 0.224*** 0.198*** 0.249*** 0.168*** 0.289***
(0.0110) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0100) (0.0170) (0.0210) (0.0240) (0.0150) (0.0210) (0.0330) (0.0250)
61 to 70 days 0.225*** 0.216*** 0.222*** 0.225*** 0.286*** 0.258*** 0.193*** 0.202*** 0.235*** 0.171*** 0.268***
(0.0087) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0084) (0.0140) (0.0170) (0.0200) (0.0120) (0.0180) (0.0270) (0.0210)
71 to 80 days 0.209*** 0.208*** 0.195*** 0.206*** 0.272*** 0.224*** 0.229*** 0.170*** 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.204***
(0.0092) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0089) (0.0140) (0.0180) (0.0210) (0.0130) (0.0190) (0.0300) (0.0220)
81 plus 0.147*** 0.155*** 0.122*** 0.150*** 0.233*** 0.184*** 0.168*** 0.115*** 0.161*** 0.124*** 0.195***
(0.0071) (0.0110) (0.0096) (0.0069) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0170) (0.0100) (0.0150) (0.0220) (0.0190)
Home Team Form Variables
Games Ahead 0.00769*** 0.0067 0.00730** 0.0120*** 0.0132*** 0.00952 0.0173*** 0.00781*** 0.0039 -0.0288** 0.0258***
(0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0040) (0.0065) (0.0052) (0.0030) (0.0097) (0.0140) (0.0080)
Games Back -0.0269*** -0.0258*** -0.0326*** -0.0268*** -0.0161*** -0.0187*** -0.0167*** -0.0416*** -0.0329*** -0.0282*** -0.0157***
(0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0020)
Games Ahead *  -0.0000308 -0.0000227 -0.0000282 -0.0000559** -0.0000847** 0.0000207 -0.000201*** -0.0000803*** -0.0000166 0.000319** -0.00000522
Games to Go (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Games Back * -0.00000882 0.00000926 -0.0000117 -0.0000115 -0.0000329 -0.0000805*** -0.0000856*** 0.0000862*** 0.0000416 -0.00000963 -0.0000242
Games to Go (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fixed Effects Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section
-Row
Sale Format No No No Yes No No No No No No No
Dummies
Average Buyer 54.94 54.94 54.94 54.94 65.06 29.82 89.53 80.31 48.71 40.46 39.81
Price $
Within R
2 0.08 0.05 0.0475 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.11
Observations 300,379 300,379 300,379 300,379 103,838 89,308 74,140 92,520 86,208 48,071 73,580
Notes: all specifications include dummies for the number of seats in the listing (1-6), the feedback score of the seller (4 dummies), dummies for ticket and listing characteristics (e.g., piggy back seats), away team form
variables and dummies for if feedback or shipping cost information is missing (1,352 observations).  Specifications with game-section fixed effects also include row quality control variables.  Standard errors in 
parentheses. ***,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.  Within R2 does not include fixed effects.  Buyer prices include shipping costs.  Seller prices exclude commissions.
Table 4: Market 2 Transactions(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample Fixed Prices Auctions Fixed Prices Auctions Fixed Prices Auctions Fixed Prices Auctions
Teams All All All All Most Listed Most Listed Less Listed Less Listed
Dep. Var Log(Fixed Price) Log(Auction Start) Log(Fixed Price) Log(Auction Start) Log(Fixed Price) Log(Auction Start) Log(Fixed Price) Log(Auction Start)
Date Used Listing Start Date Listing Start Date Listing End Date Listing End Date Listing Start Date Listing Start Date Listing Start Date Listing Start Date
Day to Go Dummies (0-2 excluded)
3 to 5 days 0.134*** 0.0228 0.114*** -0.0409*** 0.142*** 0.0382* 0.103*** -0.0494
(0.007) (0.018) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007) (0.020) (0.013) (0.037)
6 to 8 days 0.200*** -0.0356* 0.165*** -0.0663*** 0.206*** -0.00264 0.173*** -0.178***
(0.007) (0.019) (0.005) (0.017) (0.008) (0.022) (0.013) (0.040)
9 to 11 days 0.264*** 0.00351 0.205*** 0.0900*** 0.271*** 0.0443* 0.237*** -0.172***
(0.007) (0.020) (0.006) (0.019) (0.008) (0.023) (0.014) (0.043)
12 to 14 days 0.302*** -0.0153 0.233*** 0.204*** 0.306*** 0.0122 0.281*** -0.144***
(0.007) (0.021) (0.006) (0.020) (0.008) (0.024) (0.014) (0.043)
15 to 17 days 0.327*** 0.107*** 0.256*** 0.319*** 0.331*** 0.167*** 0.308*** -0.121**
(0.007) (0.023) (0.006) (0.022) (0.009) (0.026) (0.014) (0.048)
18 to 20 days 0.365*** 0.242*** 0.267*** 0.326*** 0.364*** 0.264*** 0.357*** 0.125**
(0.007) (0.024) (0.007) (0.025) (0.009) (0.028) (0.014) (0.050)
21 to 23 days 0.382*** 0.344*** 0.288*** 0.346*** 0.385*** 0.385*** 0.365*** 0.164***
(0.008) (0.025) (0.007) (0.028) (0.009) (0.028) (0.015) (0.055)
24 to 26 days 0.386*** 0.371*** 0.287*** 0.351*** 0.384*** 0.412*** 0.383*** 0.188***
(0.008) (0.028) (0.007) (0.028) (0.009) (0.032) (0.017) (0.060)
27 to 29 days 0.405*** 0.366*** 0.297*** 0.380*** 0.410*** 0.394*** 0.385*** 0.233***
(0.008) (0.030) (0.008) (0.030) (0.010) (0.034) (0.016) (0.059)
30 to 32 days 0.413*** 0.388*** 0.302*** 0.518*** 0.417*** 0.388*** 0.394*** 0.357***
(0.009) (0.031) (0.008) (0.030) (0.010) (0.036) (0.017) (0.062)
33 to 35 days 0.416*** 0.411*** 0.323*** 0.537*** 0.418*** 0.430*** 0.405*** 0.308***
(0.009) (0.033) (0.008) (0.031) (0.010) (0.038) (0.018) (0.062)
36 to 38 days 0.422*** 0.462*** 0.318*** 0.567*** 0.425*** 0.494*** 0.406*** 0.309***
(0.009) (0.033) (0.008) (0.034) (0.010) (0.038) (0.020) (0.065)
39 to 41 days 0.440*** 0.552*** 0.303*** 0.642*** 0.440*** 0.584*** 0.431*** 0.403***
(0.010) (0.034) (0.008) (0.036) (0.011) (0.039) (0.021) (0.070)
42 to 44 days 0.440*** 0.601*** 0.313*** 0.551*** 0.437*** 0.665*** 0.449*** 0.321***
(0.010) (0.035) (0.009) (0.037) (0.012) (0.040) (0.019) (0.070)
45 to 47 days 0.440*** 0.587*** 0.307*** 0.621*** 0.436*** 0.610*** 0.451*** 0.493***
(0.009) (0.038) (0.010) (0.038) (0.011) (0.043) (0.019) (0.077)
48 to 50 days 0.434*** 0.659*** 0.320*** 0.611*** 0.433*** 0.716*** 0.432*** 0.412***
(0.010) (0.040) (0.009) (0.039) (0.011) (0.045) (0.023) (0.077)
51 to 55 days 0.430*** 0.625*** 0.305*** 0.706*** 0.431*** 0.652*** 0.418*** 0.511***
(0.009) (0.034) (0.008) (0.033) (0.010) (0.038) (0.020) (0.069)
56 to 60 days 0.447*** 0.710*** 0.321*** 0.694*** 0.446*** 0.718*** 0.445*** 0.664***
(0.009) (0.035) (0.008) (0.035) (0.010) (0.040) (0.019) (0.065)
61 to 70 days 0.464*** 0.741*** 0.341*** 0.752*** 0.462*** 0.751*** 0.460*** 0.698***
(0.008) (0.030) (0.007) (0.030) (0.009) (0.035) (0.018) (0.059)
71 to 80 days 0.479*** 0.806*** 0.357*** 0.761*** 0.482*** 0.814*** 0.458*** 0.780***
(0.009) (0.033) (0.008) (0.032) (0.009) (0.037) (0.020) (0.064)
81 plus 0.521*** 0.907*** 0.385*** 0.892*** 0.528*** 0.897*** 0.483*** 0.952***
(0.008) (0.029) (0.008) (0.028) (0.009) (0.032) (0.017) (0.060)
Home Team Form Variables
Games Ahead 0.0109*** -0.0374*** 0.00814*** -0.0374*** 0.00961*** -0.0431*** 0.00162 -0.0509
(0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.013) (0.011) (0.032)
Games Back -0.0208*** -0.0222*** -0.0199*** -0.0221*** -0.0288*** -0.0354*** -0.00874*** -0.000856
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008)
Games Ahead *  -0.000036 0.000393*** -0.0000221 0.000393*** -0.0000209 0.000422*** 0.0000501 0.000552*
Games to Go (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Games Back * 0.0000734*** 0.000285*** 0.0000658*** 0.000290*** 0.000129*** 0.000375*** 0.0000221 0.000137
Games to Go (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Effects Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section
Sale Format Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
Average Dep 69.88 34.94 69.88 34.94 73.22 36.19 60.61 31.29
Var $
Within R
2 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.17
Observations 390,834 450,425 390,834 450,425 287,067 335,020 103,767 115,405
Notes: see Table 4.  Fixed price sample includes pure fixed price, personal offer and hybrid auction listings.  Auction sample includes pure single unit auctions, hybrid auctions and multiple unit auctions.  Prices do not
include shipping costs.
Table 5: Market 2 Listings(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sample Market 2 Market 2 Market 2 Market 2 Stubhub Stubhub Market 2 Market 2 Market 2 Market 2
Fixed Prices Fixed Prices Auctions Auctions Likely First Likely First Fixed Prices Auctions Fixed Prices Auctions
Listing Listing Experienced Experienced Inexperienced Inexperienced
Dep. Var Log(Fixed Price) Log(Fixed Price) Log(Auction Start) Log(Auction Start) Log(Fixed Price) Log(Fixed Price) Log(Fixed Price) Log(Auction Start) Log(Fixed Price) Log(Auction Start)
Day to Go Dummies (0-2 excluded)
3 to 5 days 0.197*** 0.194*** 0.165*** 0.142*** 0.0990*** 0.0979*** 0.235*** -0.310*** 0.0912*** 0.0632
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) (0.063) (0.014) (0.041)
6 to 8 days 0.323*** 0.316*** 0.296*** 0.251*** 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.370*** -0.191*** 0.158*** 0.0720*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) (0.065) (0.016) (0.043)
9 to 11 days 0.408*** 0.398*** 0.470*** 0.401*** 0.168*** 0.166*** 0.468*** 0.167** 0.230*** 0.0824*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) (0.071) (0.017) (0.046)
12 to 14 days 0.468*** 0.455*** 0.614*** 0.524*** 0.193*** 0.189*** 0.516*** 0.207*** 0.268*** 0.0714
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) (0.066) (0.018) (0.048)
15 to 17 days 0.521*** 0.505*** 0.706*** 0.596*** 0.214*** 0.209*** 0.568*** 0.363*** 0.299*** 0.130**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.017) (0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.068) (0.019) (0.054)
18 to 20 days 0.564*** 0.545*** 0.832*** 0.703*** 0.232*** 0.225*** 0.618*** 0.580*** 0.313*** 0.222***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.017) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.068) (0.019) (0.056)
21 to 23 days 0.586*** 0.565*** 0.923*** 0.777*** 0.247*** 0.239*** 0.620*** 0.541*** 0.344*** 0.324***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.068) (0.021) (0.059)
24 to 26 days 0.605*** 0.581*** 0.976*** 0.814*** 0.263*** 0.253*** 0.625*** 0.590*** 0.359*** 0.338***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.020) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) (0.081) (0.027) (0.066)
27 to 29 days 0.620*** 0.594*** 1.027*** 0.848*** 0.273*** 0.262*** 0.647*** 0.517*** 0.342*** 0.369***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.019) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.076) (0.026) (0.069)
30 to 32 days 0.641*** 0.612*** 1.053*** 0.857*** 0.282*** 0.270*** 0.663*** 0.579*** 0.354*** 0.299***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.022) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.077) (0.024) (0.072)
33 to 35 days 0.655*** 0.624*** 1.116*** 0.906*** 0.290*** 0.276*** 0.666*** 0.627*** 0.381*** 0.475***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.020) (0.022) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.083) (0.026) (0.078)
36 to 38 days 0.669*** 0.636*** 1.135*** 0.912*** 0.298*** 0.282*** 0.671*** 0.585*** 0.387*** 0.424***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.024) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.076) (0.027) (0.083)
39 to 41 days 0.676*** 0.641*** 1.219*** 0.982*** 0.305*** 0.287*** 0.675*** 0.673*** 0.384*** 0.433***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.025) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.082) (0.028) (0.084)
42 to 44 days 0.679*** 0.642*** 1.223*** 0.972*** 0.310*** 0.291*** 0.692*** 0.729*** 0.406*** 0.515***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.023) (0.025) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.082) (0.030) (0.091)
45 to 47 days 0.699*** 0.662*** 1.230*** 0.962*** 0.315*** 0.294*** 0.712*** 0.810*** 0.437*** 0.495***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.024) (0.027) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.097) (0.033) (0.100)
48 to 50 days 0.700*** 0.661*** 1.275*** 0.995*** 0.320*** 0.297*** 0.689*** 0.739*** 0.404*** 0.443***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.024) (0.027) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.095) (0.034) (0.110)
51 to 55 days 0.707*** 0.666*** 1.303*** 0.999*** 0.325*** 0.300*** 0.710*** 0.793*** 0.388*** 0.458***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.022) (0.026) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.080) (0.031) (0.097)
56 to 60 days 0.730*** 0.686*** 1.350*** 1.025*** 0.330*** 0.302*** 0.723*** 0.729*** 0.381*** 0.562***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.023) (0.027) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.081) (0.030) (0.097)
61 to 70 days 0.738*** 0.692*** 1.373*** 1.011*** 0.338*** 0.305*** 0.753*** 0.803*** 0.329*** 0.529***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.021) (0.026) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.077) (0.028) (0.086)
71 to 80 days 0.747*** 0.697*** 1.457*** 1.047*** 0.344*** 0.306*** 0.781*** 0.983*** 0.353*** 0.385***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.022) (0.029) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.081) (0.031) (0.098)
81 plus 0.781*** 0.719*** 1.635*** 1.069*** 0.364*** 0.307*** 0.838*** 1.294*** 0.342*** 0.432***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.021) (0.033) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.082) (0.026) (0.078)
Days Since First Listing
Tenure - -0.00229*** - -0.0142*** - -0.0000950** ----
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Tenure^2/100 - 0.00313*** - 0.0325*** - -0.00194*** ----
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Tenure^3/(10^4) - -0.00160*** - -0.0396*** - 0.00224*** ----
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Tenure^4/(10^6) - 0.000274 - 0.0191*** - -0.00109*** ----
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Tenure^5/(10^8) - -0.00000859 - -0.00323*** - 0.000182*** ----
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Effects Seller- Seller- Seller- Seller- Ticket Id Ticket Id Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section
Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section Game-Section
Sale Format
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No (one format) No (one format) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 390,834 390,834 450,425 450,425 1,965,659 1,965,659 118,187 74,454 76,887 139,974
Notes: see Tables 4 and 5.  Specifications also include home team form variables.
Table 6: Testing the Lazear (1986) Explanation for Falling PricesListing Sample Pure Fixed Price Pure Auction
Price (relative to face value) Fixed Price Auction Start Auction Start Fixed Price
Seller Within 40 km -0.0218 0.018 -0.0329* -0.0375*
(0.024) (0.028) (0.020) (0.023)
    * 1-10 Days Prior to Game 0.0482 0.023 0.0291 0.0298
(0.030) (0.029) (0.021) (0.025)
    * 11-20 Days Prior to Game 0.0223 -0.016 0.0357*** 0.0349*
(0.028) (0.028) (0.023) (0.029)
    * 21-40 Days Prior to Game -0.0224 -0.019 0.00393 0.0384**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.028)
Seller More than 200 km 0.163*** -0.0493** -0.0366* -0.0294
(0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023)
    * 1-10 Days Prior to Game -0.229*** -0.0477** -0.00819 -0.0304
(0.029) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025)
    * 11-20 Days Prior to Game -0.133*** -0.038 -0.015 0.0102
(0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.026)
    * 21-40 Days Prior to Game -0.0566** 0.007 -0.0368* -0.0283
(0.027) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025)
Proportion of Seller's Unsold Listings  -0.118*** -0.0538* 0.137*** 0.0700***
During Time Period Relisted on Market 2 (0.033) (0.030) (0.025) (0.031)
    * 1-10 Days Prior to Game -0.0901* 0.284*** -0.173*** -0.172***
(0.050) (0.033) (0.029) (0.037)
    * 11-20 Days Prior to Game -0.131** 0.146*** -0.119*** -0.137***
(0.063) (0.035) (0.031) (0.042)
    * 21-40 Days Prior to Game -0.424*** 0.256*** -0.0354 -0.0648**
(0.050) (0.038) (0.034) (0.042)
Proportion of Seller's Other Listings -0.101* 0.232*** 0.149*** 0.153***
in Hybrid Auction Format (0.056) (0.052) (0.034) (0.039)
    * 1-10 Days Prior to Game 0.162** -0.045 -0.0470 -0.116***
(0.067) (0.056) (0.035) (0.042)
    * 11-20 Days Prior to Game 0.270*** -0.007 -0.0426* -0.0293
(0.072) (0.055) (0.038) (0.043)
    * 21-40 Days Prior to Game 0.0918* -0.046 -0.00315 -0.0511
(0.071) (0.056) (0.040) (0.048)
Proportion of Seller's Other Listings 0.138*** 0.476*** 0.119*** 0.218***
in Pure Fixed Price Formats (0.040) (0.049) (0.043) (0.052)
    * 1-10 Days Prior to Game -0.226*** -0.602*** -0.0927* -0.234***
(0.047) (0.054) (0.048) (0.060)
    * 11-20 Days Prior to Game 0.0388 -0.476*** -0.119** -0.172**
(0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.068)
    * 21-40 Days Prior to Game 0.016 -0.351*** -0.0117 -0.0334
(0.054) (0.061) (0.053) (0.062)
-
Average Relative Fixed Price in  - -0.202*** 0.391***
other Hybrid Auction Listings - (0.012) (0.014)
    * 1-10 Days Prior to Game - 0.0678*** 0.0453***
- (0.013) (0.017)
    * 11-20 Days Prior to Game - 0.0904*** 0.0207**
- (0.021) (0.023)
    * 21-40 Days Prior to Game - 0.0701*** -0.0644*
(0.016) (0.035)
-
Average Relative Start Price  - 0.599*** -0.128***
in other Hybrid Auction Listings - (0.014) (0.016)
    * 1-10 Days Prior to Game - 0.0530*** 0.0793***
- (0.019) (0.021)
    * 11-20 Days Prior to Game - 0.00197 0.0429*
- (0.023) (0.025)
    * 21-40 Days Prior to Game - -0.0430** 0.0845**
(0.022) (0.036)
Observations 109,296 182,302 115,406 115,406
F-statistic on the instruments 15.71 47.75 231.84 76.43
Notes: Specifications also include competition variables, dummies for number of seats, seller feedback scores, ticket and listing characteristics,
row quality controls, home team dummies, home team*face value interactions, home team*game expected attendance interactions and
dummies for sellers with 1 and less than 10 listings.  Standard errors in parentheses clustered on the game.  ***,** and * denote significance
 at the 1, 5 and 10% levels
Hybrid Auction
Table 7: Regressions of Market 2 Prices on Instruments(1) (2) (3)
Probit Model Probit Model  Probit Model 
With Control Function With Control Function




Relative Fixed Price -0.200*** -0.895*** -0.805***
(0.014) (0.045) (0.049)
1-10 Days Prior to Game*Relative Price 0.072*** 0.007 -0.018
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022)
11-20 Days Prior to Game*Relative Price 0.066*** 0.012 -0.003
(0.016) (0.022) (0.024)
21-40 Days Prior to Game*Relative Price 0.0351** -0.019 -0.051**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.025)
Competition Coefficients
Mean Relative Price for Fixed Price Listings 0.092*** 0.258*** 0.398***
(0.012) (0.021) (0.086)
Mean Relative Start Price for Auction Listings 0.028** 0.080*** 0.070
(0.014) (0.017) (0.064)
Minimum Relative Price for Fixed Price Listings 0.000 0.049*** -0.247**
(0.011) (0.016) (0.107)
Minimum Relative Price for Auction Listings -0.041** -0.080*** -0.146**
(0.015) (0.017) (0.073)
Dummy Variable for No Competing  0.275*** 0.689*** 0.344***
Fixed Price Listings  (0.029) (0.043) (0.124)
Dummy Variable for No Competing  -0.091*** -0.146*** -0.142***
Auction Listings (0.023) (0.023) (0.036)
Number of Competing Fixed Price Listings -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Proportion of Competing Fixed Price Listings with -0.053 0.035 -0.190**
Seller Feedback Scores Above 100 (0.040) (0.041) (0.087)
Number of Competing Auction Listings 0.001 0.004* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Proportion of Competing Auction Listings with -0.018 -0.078*** -0.031
Seller Feedback Scores Above 100 (0.023) (0.022) (0.028)
Mean Probability of Sale Elasticities at Observed Prices
1-10 Days Prior to Game -0.190 -1.660 -1.482
11-20 Days Prior to Game -0.280 -2.350 -2.075
21-40 Days Prior to Game -0.460 -3.270 -2.949
More than 41 Days Prior to Game -0.750 -4.300 -3.735
Number  of observations 109,296 109,296 109,296
Notes: Specifications also include dummies for number of seats, seller feedback scores, ticket and listing characteristics,
row quality controls, home team dummies, home team*face value interactions, home team*game expected attendance
interactions and dummies for sellers with 1 and less than 10 listings.  Standard errors in parentheses clustered on the 
game (for control function models they are estimated using a bootstrap with 200 repetitions).  ***,** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.  Coefficients in columns (2) and (3) have been rescaled to be comparable with
those in column (1).
Table 8: Fixed Price Probability of Sale Model1-10 11-20 21-40 41 plus
Observed
Mean Price $ 53.58 60.93 65.81 69.44
Median Price $ 40.63 49.50 54.20 58.50
Counterfactual: demand parameters same as 11-14 days prior to game
                         competition variables same as average 11-20 days before game
Mean Price $ 50.26 59.41 65.66 68.99
Median Price $ 39.78 49.35 55.13 59.40
1-10 11-20 21-40 41 plus
Observed
Mean Price $ 53.58 60.93 65.81 69.44
Median Price $ 40.63 49.50 54.20 58.50
Counterfactual: demand parameters same as 11-14 days prior to game
                         competition variables same as average 11-20 days before game
Mean Price $ 50.58 58.39 64.33 69.40
Median Price $ 40.95 49.38 54.95 59.89
1-10 11-20 21-40 41 plus
Observed
Mean Price $ 20.95 21.59 25.91 31.14
Median Price $ 11.50 11.95 14.87 23.32
Counterfactual: demand/revenue parameters same as 11-14 days prior to game
                         competition variables same as average 11-20 days before game
Mean Price $ 24.60 21.68 25.15 28.85
Median Price $ 15.96 11.70 13.78 20.47
1-10 11-20 21-40 41 plus
Observed
Mean Price $ 31.21 34.39 41.92 52.25
Median Price $ 23.76 27.00 33.99 44.78
Counterfactual: demand/revenue parameters same as 11-14 days prior to game
                         competition variables same as average 11-20 days before game
Mean Price $ 36.34 39.65 49.16 61.79
Median Price $ 27.63 30.60 39.60 50.60
Days Prior to Game
Table 9: Counterfactuals Using Estimated Pricing Models
(b) Counterfactuals for Fixed Price Model
(c) Counterfactual for Single Unit Pure Auction Model
Relative Price Specification
Days Prior to Game
(d) Counterfactual for Auction Start Prices in Hybrid Auction Model
Days Prior to Game
(a) Counterfactuals for Fixed Price Model
Relative Price Specification
Days Prior to Game
Log Price Specification
Relative Price Specification(1) (2)
Probability of Sale Revenue Function
With Control Function With Control Function
to Address Own and to Address Own and




Relative Fixed Price -1.177*** 0.300***
(0.068) (0.086)
1-10 Days Prior to Game*Relative Price -0.247*** -0.172***
(0.056) (0.061)
11-20 Days Prior to Game*Relative Price -0.251*** -0.021
(0.055) (0.055)
21-40 Days Prior to Game*Relative Price -0.266*** 0.001
(0.050) (0.058)
Competition Coefficients
Mean Relative Price for Fixed Price Listings 0.272*** 0.526***
(0.096) (0.171)
Mean Relative Start Price for Auction Listings 0.012 0.310**
(0.078) (0.139)
Minimum Relative Price for Fixed Price Listings 0.102 -0.37*
(0.138) (0.211)
Minimum Relative Price for Auction Listings -0.029 -0.445**
(0.106) (0.182)
Dummy Variable for No Competing  0.718*** 0.642***
Fixed Price Listings  (0.076) (0.154)
Dummy Variable for No Competing  -0.027 -0.182**
Auction Listings (0.033) (0.071)
Number of Competing Fixed Price Listings -0.050 -0.337***
(0.066) (0.129)
Proportion of Competing Fixed Price Listings with -0.004 0.056
Seller Feedback Scores Above 100 (0.027) (0.057)
Number of Competing Auction Listings 0.015 0.076
(0.024) (0.082)
Proportion of Competing Auction Listings with -0.020 -0.371***
Seller Feedback Scores Above 100 (0.074) (0.127)
Standard Deviation 0.852***
(0.017)
Mean Probability of Sale Elasticities at Observed Prices
1-10 Days Prior to Game -0.86
11-20 Days Prior to Game -0.84
21-40 Days Prior to Game -1.13
More than 41 Days Prior to Game -1.37
Median Opportunity Costs Relative to Ticket Face Values
1-10 Days Prior to Game
11-20 Days Prior to Game
21-40 Days Prior to Game
More than 41 Days Prior to Game
Number  of observations 182,302 122,609
Notes: Specifications also include dummies for number of seats, seller feedback scores, ticket and listing characteristics,
row quality controls, home team dummies, home team*face value interactions, home team*game expected attendance
interactions and dummies for sellers with 1 and less than 10 listings.  Standard errors in parentheses clustered on the 
game estimated using a bootstrap with 200 repetitions.  ***,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.
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Probability of Sale Revenue Function
With Control Function With Control Function
to Address Own and to Address Own and
Competitor Price Competitor Price
Endogeneity Endogeneity
(Trinomial Logit) (Censored Normal)
Own Price Coefficients
Relative Auction Start -2.291*** 0.005
(0.096) (0.028)
1-10 Days Prior to Game*Relative Start Price 0.061*** 0.213***
(0.098) (0.028)
11-20 Days Prior to Game*Relative Start Price -0.177*** 0.180***
(0.121) (0.031)
21-40 Days Prior to Game*Relative Start Price -0.040 0.125***
(0.093) (0.040)
Relative Fixed Price -1.124*** 0.677***
(0.123) (0.033)
1-10 Days Prior to Game*Relative Fixed Price 0.296*** -0.155***
(0.089) (0.027)
11-20 Days Prior to Game*Relative Fixed Price 0.167* -0.140***
(0.097) (0.027)
21-40 Days Prior to Game*Relative Fixed Price 0.090 -0.060***
(0.077) (0.032)
Standard Deviation - 0.535***
(0.008)
Mean Probability of Sale Elasticities wrt Auction Start Price at Observed Prices
1-10 Days Prior to Game -0.46
11-20 Days Prior to Game -0.57
21-40 Days Prior to Game -0.76
More than 41 Days Prior to Game -1.00
Mean Probability of Sale Elasticities wrt Fixed Price at Observed Prices
1-10 Days Prior to Game -0.26
11-20 Days Prior to Game -0.30
21-40 Days Prior to Game -0.39
More than 41 Days Prior to Game -0.50
Median Opportunity Costs Relative to Ticket Face Values Implied by Auction Start Prices
1-10 Days Prior to Game 0.004
11-20 Days Prior to Game 0.116
21-40 Days Prior to Game 0.516
More than 41 Days Prior to Game 0.809
Number  of observations 115,406 37,567
Notes: Specifications also include competition variables, number of seat and feedback dummies, ticket and listing characteristics,
row quality controls, home team dummies, home team*face value interactions, home team*game expected attendance
interactions and dummies for sellers with 1 and less than 10 listings.  Standard errors in parentheses clustered on the 
game estimated using a bootstrap with 200 repetitions.  ***,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.
Table 11: Hybrid Auction Listing ModelsProbit Model Probit Model
for Ticket Availability Shape Parameters Scale Parameters for Ticket Availability Shape Parameters Scale Parameters
Monday 0.110*** 0.1179*** - Main Effects (Arizona Diamondbacks)
(0.017) (0.006) Constant -4.346*** -1.5174*** 0.8612***
Tuesday 0.246*** 0.088*** - (0.920) (0.436) (0.075)
(0.017) (0.006) Log(Face Value) 2.311*** 0.3982 0.9191***
Wednesday 0.304*** 0.1378*** - (0.510) (0.260) (0.039)
(0.017) (0.006) Log(Face Value)^2 -0.469*** -0.0124 -0.071***
Thursday -0.139*** 0.1876*** - (0.074) (0.039) (0.006)
(0.017) (0.007) Expected Attendance 5.157*** 0.3841*** 1.5181***
Friday -0.0797*** 0.1205*** - (0.360) (0.148) (0.014)
(0.014) (0.005)
Saturday -0.204*** 0.1173*** - Interaction Effects for Selected Teams (not reported for other teams)
(0.014) (0.005) Boston Red Sox Interactions
Constant 0.839 6.9176*** -
Feedback 10-100 -0.0616** 0.0484*** - (1.020) (0.463)
(0.028) (0.009) Log(Face Value) 0.607 -2.8615*** -
Feedback 100-1000 -0.278*** 0.1365*** - (0.560) (0.272)
(0.027) (0.008) Log(Face Value)^2 -0.066 0.4391*** -
Feedback Greater Than 1000 -1.016*** 0.4668*** - (0.079) (0.041)
(0.027) (0.008) Expected Attendance -3.184*** -2.6557*** -
(0.390) (0.156)
Two Seats 0.0273 0.1265*** -0.8503***
(0.049) (0.026) (0.034) Chicago Cubs Interactions
Three Seats -1.561*** 0.677*** -0.7061*** Constant -7.267*** 0.1359 -
(0.054) (0.035) (0.044) (1.210) (0.522)
Four Seats -1.675*** 0.7307*** -0.9805*** Log(Face Value) 3.160*** -0.7041** -
(0.050) (0.028) (0.036) (0.700) (0.314)
Five Seats -2.594*** 1.0927*** -1.2669*** Log(Face Value)^2 -0.576*** 0.1888*** -
(0.067) (0.069) (0.081) (0.100) (0.047)
Six Seats -2.832*** 0.8063*** -1.1756*** Expected Attendance 2.269*** -0.4126*** -
(0.061) (0.065) (0.077) (0.450) (0.166)
Front Row -0.106*** 0.0016 0.0225 Average Availiability 0.88, 0.88
(0.014) (0.009) (0.011)     Data, Predicted
Second Row -0.0950*** -0.0037*** 0.0191***
(0.015) (0.010) (0.012) Average Prices
Row Number 0.0224*** -0.0064*** -0.0004***     Data, Predicted
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Row N/A 0.860*** 0.1774*** -0.5532*** Std Deviation Prices
(0.064) (0.022) (0.025)     Data, Predicted
No Row Listed 0.766*** -0.2904*** 0.0253***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.013) Log-Likelihood -58,168.2
Number of Observations 289,784
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.   ***,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.  Specification also includes month of game dummies.
Table 12: Models for Ticket Availability and Expected Prices Five Days Prior to Game
255,885




Gamma Model for Prices of Available Tickets
under assumption that buyer only considers tickets wihch are better than those she bought and that she considers auction listings which close 5 days before the game with no bidders to be availableSearch/Return to  CARA Coefficient Loss Aversion Cost
Market Cost $10 $25 $50 $75
Assumption 1: Substitution Only to Better Tickets, Valued Same as Purchased, Auction Listings Available
$0 Risk Neutral $0 29% 41% 49% 52%
$10 Risk Neutral $0 52% 58% 62% 65%
$25 Risk Neutral $0 71% 73% 75% 77%
$50 Risk Neutral $0 86% 86% 87% 87%
$0 0.05 $0 42% 66% 84% 92%
$0 Risk Neutral $25 61% 64% 66% 68%
$25 0.05 $0 87% 92% 96% 98%
$25 Risk Neutral $25 76% 77% 78% 79%
Assumption 2: Substitution Only to Better Tickets, Valued Same as Purchased, Only Fixed Price Available
$0 Risk Neutral $0 46% 57% 62% 65%
$10 Risk Neutral $0 66% 70% 73% 74%
$25 Risk Neutral $0 80% 81% 83% 83%
$50 Risk Neutral $0 90% 91% 91% 91%
$0 0.05 $0 58% 74% 84% 89%
$0 Risk Neutral $25 72% 74% 75% 76%
$25 0.05 $0 90% 92% 95% 97%
$25 Risk Neutral $25 83% 84% 84% 85%
Assumption 3: Substitution Only to All Tickets, Value Varies with Face Value, Auction Listings Available
$0 Risk Neutral $0 2% 6% 10% 12%
$10 Risk Neutral $0 7% 12% 17% 19%
$25 Risk Neutral $0 24% 31% 35% 36%
$50 Risk Neutral $0 58% 59% 59% 59%
$0 0.05 $0 11% 24% 34% 38%
$0 Risk Neutral $25 17% 21% 24% 25%
$25 0.05 $0 56% 59% 61% 62%
$25 Risk Neutral $25 34% 38% 41% 41%
Assumption 4: Substitution Only to All Tickets, Value Varies with Face Value, Only Fixed Price Available
$0 Risk Neutral $0 3% 8% 15% 18%
$10 Risk Neutral $0 9% 18% 26% 29%
$25 Risk Neutral $0 35% 43% 47% 48%
$50 Risk Neutral $0 66% 67% 67% 67%
$0 0.05 $0 17% 36% 47% 51%
$0 Risk Neutral $25 26% 31% 36% 37%
$25 0.05 $0 64% 67% 69% 70%
$25 Risk Neutral $25 46% 50% 52% 53%
Valuation of Tickets Above Price Paid
Table 13: Rationalizing Observed Early Purchase Decisions
rationalized for different values of the parameters
table shows the proportion of purchases taking place more than 10 days prior to the game which can beDep. Var Log(Buyer Distance)
Day to Go Dummies (0-2 excluded)
3 to 5 days 0.0808***
(0.013)
6 to 8 days 0.248***
(0.014)
9 to 11 days 0.374***
(0.016)
12 to 14 days 0.439***
(0.017)
15 to 17 days 0.533***
(0.019)
18 to 20 days 0.612***
(0.020)
21 to 23 days 0.607***
(0.022)
24 to 26 days 0.636***
(0.023)
27 to 29 days 0.695***
(0.025)
30 to 32 days 0.734***
(0.026)
33 to 35 days 0.709***
(0.028)
36 to 38 days 0.763***
(0.030)
39 to 41 days 0.842***
(0.031)
42 to 44 days 0.760***
(0.033)
45 to 47 days 0.802***
(0.034)
48 to 50 days 0.744***
(0.036)
51 to 55 days 0.755***
(0.030)
56 to 60 days 0.743***
(0.033)
61 to 70 days 0.815***
(0.027)









Notes: 3,821 observations with non-US buyers or missing zip code information are 
excluded. Specification also includes the same controls as specifications in Table 4.
Standard errors in parentheses. ***,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10%
levels.
Table 14(a): Timing of PurchasesDep. Var Number of Days Prior to Game
Ticket Purchased












Face Value ($) -0.042***
(0.003)
Row Variables
First Row Dummy 1.627***
(0.340)
Second Row Dummy 1.647***
(0.340)
Number of Row -0.048***
(0.014)
Game Variables
Expected Attendance as Propn of Capacity 27.57***





Notes: specification also includes third-order polynomial in the distance the buyer
lives from the stadium of the home team, a dummy for buyers within 40 km and 
home team fixed effects.  Standard errors in parentheses clustered on the game. 
 ***,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.
Table 14(b): Ticket Characteristics and the
Timing of PurchasesFigure 1: Evolution of Listings, Sales Mechanisms, Sale Probabilities and Ticket Quality As Game Approaches
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Face Value Average Row Number
Propn Listings for Front Row Seats Propn Listings for Second Row SeatsFigure 2(a): CDFs of Residuals from Regression of Log(Seller Price) on Ticket Characteristics and 

















1-10 Days 11-20 Days 21-40 Days 41-60 Days
(b) CDF of Residuals from Regression of Log(Seller Transaction Price) on Ticket Characteristics and 

















1-10 Days 11-20 Days 21-40 Days 41-60 DaysOpportunity Costs Implied by Fixed Price Listing Models Using Control Function to Address the Endogeneity of
Own and Competitor Prices
Figure 3
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1-10 Days 11-20 Days 21-40 Days 41 Plus Days